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ABSTRACT
This research was undertaken to examine the securi­
ties market reaction to the quality of segmental disclo­
sures required by FASB Statement Number 14. The investi­
gation updates the previous empirical studies which 
examined the securities market reaction to the Securities 
and Exchange Commission's Segmental disclosure rules.
Information from three hundred diversified firms 
and their beta values were obtained from the Value-line 
tape. One hundred and fifty of the firms were required 
to report segmental data in their annual financial reports. 
They were referred to as the experimental group. One 
hundred and fifty diversified firms were not required to 
report segmental data in the annual reports. They were 
referred to as the control group.
The first step was to compare the systematic risk 
of the experimental group with the control group by using 
parametric and non-parametric statistics. The second 
step was to evaluate the quality of segmental disclosures 
in the annual financial reports of the experimental group. 
Based on the disclosure quality, the sample was divided 
into the high quality disclosure and the low quality dis­
closure groups. SIC code scores were calculated for each
ix
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firm of the experimental group. A Spearman Rank Correla­
tion test was conducted to determine the correlation 
between the disclosure scores and the SIC code scores.
The results of this test indicated that the correlation 
of the two scores was statistically significant.
Multiple Discriminant Analysis was applied to the 
high quality and low quality groups, based on twelve 
financial variables which are often discussed in the 
literature as affecting systematic risk. The results 
indicated that the two groups were homogenous with re­
spect to these financial variables.
In examining the securities market reaction to the 
segmental disclosures, two major groups were identified: 
(.1) The Control Group
(.2) The Experimental Group (subdivided into two 
groups)
a. The High Qtiality Disclosure Group.
b. The Low Quality Disclosure Group.
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample test and the student's 
t-test, were used to find differences between:
(!) The Control Group and the Experimental Group.
(2) The Control Group and the High Quality Group.
(3) The Control Group and the Low Quality Group.
(.4) The High Quality Group and the Low Quality
Group.
Finally, the Analysis of Covariance test was also 
conducted to find differences between the high quality
x
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disclosure group and the low quality disclosure 
group.
The parametric and non-parametric tests gave essen­
tially the same results:
1. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test results indicated 
that there was no significant difference between the beta 
cumulative distributions of the control group and the ex­
perimental group.
2. The student's t-test results indicated that 
there was no significant difference between the two 
group means, but the two group variances were signifi­
cantly different.
3. Both test results indicated statistically sig­
nificant differences between the control group and the 
high quality group.
4. The two. test results indicated statistically 
significant differences between the control group and the 
quality group.
5. The final test examined the differences between 
the high quality disclosure and the low quality disclo­
sure groups. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov, the student's 
t-test and the Analysis of Covariance test were applied. 
The test results indicated that the betas of the two 
groups were significantly different and that their qual­
ity of disclosures were also significantly different.
xi
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Based on the above results, conclusions were drawn as 
follows:
1. The quality of disclosure is statistically re­
lated to the systematic risk.
2. The results showed that the high quality dis­
closure firms have lower systematic risk than either 
the control group or the low quality disclosure group.
3. Investors are uncertain about the segmental 
data that are not disclosed or that are not adequate 
and informative.
xii
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The Accounting Principles Board (APB) of the American 
Institute of CPAs issued Statement Number 2, entitled 
"Disclosure of Supplemental Financial Information by Di­
versified Companies", in April, 1968. The statement urged 
the diversified companies to report segment information 
voluntarily. In 1969, the Securities and Exchange Commis­
sion (SEC) required the registrants (publicly traded 
diversified companies) to disclose sales and earnings by 
line of business.
In 1969, financial, analysts, creditors, investors 
and other users of financial statements urged the account­
ing profession to address the issue of reporting finan­
cial data for segments of a diversified company. The 
Accounting Principles Board supported this idea and re­
iterated that the objectives of financial statements 
should include the following:
(1) to provide reliable financial information about 
the economic resources and obligations of a 
business enterprise;
(.2) to provide relevant financial accounting infor­
mation so that users could make economic
1




(3) to provide information that is understandable to 
the prudent users of the information (APB State­
ment Number 4, 1975).
To meet these and other objectives, financial analysts, 
accountants, creditors and other financial statement users 
urged the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) to 
issue a pronouncement on the disclosure requirements of 
diversified companies.
In December, 1976, the FASB issued Statement of 
Financial Accounting Standards Number 14, "Financial Re­
porting of Segments of a Business Enterprise", which de­
scribed industry segments, the tests of reportable seg­
ments and the requirements for segmental reporting 
disclosures. An industry segment is defined by the FASB 
as a "Component of an enterprise engaged in providing 
a product or service or a group of related products and 
services primarily to unaffiliated customers (i.e., cus­
tomers outside the enterprise) for profit" (FASB State-
1 2ment Number 14, paragraph 9). Holzapfel identified 
three factors to be considered in determining industry
^AICPA Professional Standards, Financial Account­
ing Standards Board, Statement Number 14, Paragraph 9.
2
Ibid.
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segments: (a) the nature of the product, (b) the nature of
the product process, and (c) markets and market methods.
Another factor mentioned in FASB Statement Number 14 is
that companies can treat foreign operations as segments
under some circumstances specified by the statement.
Once industry segments are determined, they must meet
one of the following tests to be considered reportable
segments: (a) its revenue must be ten percent or more
of the combined revenue of all the companies1 segments;
(b) the operating profit or loss must be ten percent or
more of the combined operating profit of all industry
segments that did not incur an operating loss, or the
combined operating loss of all industry segments that did
incur an operating loss; and (c) the identifiable assets
of each reportable segment must be ten percent or more
of the combined assets of all the companies' segments.
The Board stated that:
the reportable segments of an enterprise shall 
represent a substantial portion of the enter­
prise' s total operations. The following test 
shall be applied to determine whether a sub­
stantial portion of enterprise's operations is 
explained by its segment information. The com­
bined revenue from sales to unaffiliated cus­
tomers of all reportable segments (that is, 
revenue not including intersegment sales or 
transfers) shall constitute at least 75 percent 
of the combined revenue from sales to unaffili­
ated customers of all industry segments. The 
test shall be applied separately for each fiscal o 
year for which financial statements are presented.
OAICPA Professional Standards, 0£. cit.
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Ih addition to the tests of reportable segments, FASB 
Statement Number 14 requires that diversified companies 
disclose the following segment information:
(1) the revenue information of a reportable segment,
(2) the sales or transfers to other industry seg­
ments ,
(3) the basis of accounting for intersegment sales 
or transfers,
(4) segment operating profit or loss,
(5) expenses incurred by each reportable segment,
(.6) the tax effects of operating income or loss,
(.7) all identifiable assets including deprecia­
tion, depletion and amortization expense,
(8) capital expenditures,
(.9) equity in the net assets of unconsolidated
subsidiaries and other equity method investees,
(10) the geographic area in which the reportable 
segment operates,
(11) the foreign operation information, and
(12) the major customers.
There are three options a company may adopt in reporting 
segment information. The first option allows a company 
to include the segment information within the body of 
the financial statements with appropriate explanatory 
disclosures in the footnotes to the financial statements. 
The second option allows a company to present segment
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
information entirely in the footnotes. The third option
allows the information to be presented in a separate 
4schedule.
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
The major purpose of the study was to examine the 
reaction of the securities market to the quality of seg­
mental disclosure rules of FASB Statement Number 14.
The investigation was to determine whether the quality 
of segmental disclosures had any effect on investors' 
decisions, Quality of segmental disclosures as measured 
in the study relates to completeness and location of the 
disclosures as well as the manner of presentation, i.e., 
schedular, geographical, or narrative form.
The research was based on the assumption of the 
efficient market hypothesis of the semi-strong form which 
states that all publicly available information is impounded 
rapidly in security prices."* One problem addressed in 
this study is whether or not the segment data is new 
information, a second problem is whether the securities 
market can distinguish the quality of segmental disclosure
4AICPA Professional Standards, 0£. cit.
^Fama, E. F., "The Behavior of Stock Market Prices," 
Journal of Business, (January, 1955), pp. 34-105.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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in determining market risk. The implications of the secu­
rities market reaction to segment information must there­
fore be addressed. If the securities market distinguishes 
high quality segment information from low quality segment 
information, the FASB's position is affirmed and the high 
quality disclosures represent models which other firms 
should emulate. If there is a market reaction to the seg­
mental disclosures, but not to the quality of disclosures, 
segmental data is new information the market and the FASB's 
position is also affirmed but the type of disclosure is 
immaterial. If the segmental disclosures do not cause 
market reactions by providing new information, the FASB's 
position of requiring the segmental data may be questioned, 
as the disclosures are not provided without a cost.
ANTICIPATED CONTRIBUTION OF THE STUDY
This study provides some evidence of the effect of 
segmental disclosures (as required by the FASB Statement 
Number 14) on the systematic risk associated with diver­
sified firms. While segmental disclosure is not an ab­
solute determinant of the systematic risk, it may be a 
factor. Moreover, empirical research has not dealt with 
the segmental disclosures based on FASB Statement Number 
14. This study is the first to measure the significance 
of the segmental disclosures on the systematic risk of 
the firms which have been required to report segmental 
data under FASB Statement 14.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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The study updates and substantiates several of the 
previous studies conducted under the SEC segmental dis­
closure rules. These previous studies indicated in­
vestors do react to the SEC segmental disclosures. Im­
provements in the previous research methodologies are 
included and >discussed in Chapter 3.
OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY
The main objective of this research is to examine 
the impact of segmental reporting disclosures on the 
securities market. Specifically, the objectives of the 
research study are:
1. To investigate whether the securities market 
reacts to segmental reporting disclosures in assessing 
the systematic risk of the diversified companies.
2. To update the previous studies on segmental re­
porting disclosures. For example, Kochanek^ used 1966, 
1967, 1968 and 1969 data. Singhvi and Desai^ used 1965
O
and 1966 data. Horwitz and Kolcdny used 1969 data.
Kochanek, R, , "Segmental Financial Disclosures 
and Security Prices," The Accounting Review, (April, 
1974), pp. 254-258.
^Singhvi, Surendra and Harsha B. Desai, "An 
Empirical Analysis of the Quality of Corporate Financial 
Disclosure," The Accounting Review, (January, 1971), 
pp. 129-138.
oHorwitz, Bertrand and Richard Kolodny, "Line of 
Business Reporting and Security Prices: An Analysis of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Simonds and Collins used 1967-1970 data. These previous 
studies did not look into the effect of FASB's Statement 
14 issued in December, 1976 on segmental disclosure re­
quirements. They investigated the effect of SEC segmental 
disclosure requirements by using SEC 10-K reports. Since 
the investing public (investors, financial arialysts, 
creditors) often turn to the annual financial reports for 
information, a testable hypothesis is whether the impact 
of segmental disclosures in annual financial reports on 
the securities market will be significant.
SCOPE OF THE STUDY
To accomplish the purposes of this investigation, 
primary attention was given to the following areas:
1. The objectives and requirements of segmental 
reporting, based on FASB Statement Number 14.
2. The accounting variables that affect syste­
matic risk in addition to quality of segmental disclo­
sures.
3. The relationship between systematic risk and 
segmental disclosures.
an SEC Disclosure Rule," The Bell Journal of Economics, 
Volume 8, Number 1, (Spring, 1977), pp. 235^249.
qSimonds, Richard R. and Daniel W. Collins, "Line 
of Business Reporting and Security Prices: An Analysis
of an SEC Disclosure Rule: Comment," The Bell Journal
of Economics, Volume 9, (Autumn, 1978), pp. 646-658.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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4. Evaluation of the quality of segmental dis­
closures in annual reports based on FASB Statement Number 
14 using an appropriate evaluation tool.
5. The use of statistical tools to examine risk 
associated with the firms and the quality of their dis­
closures .
PREVIEW OF THE PLAN OF INQUIRY
The investigation addresses systematic risk (market 
beta of firms) and the quality of segmental disclosures 
as enunciated by FASB Statement Number 14. The plan of 
inquiry takes the following pattern: Chapter one con­
sists of the introduction, statement of the problem, the 
anticipated contributions of the study, the objectives 
of the study, the scope of the study, and the preview of 
the plan of inquiry. Chapter two reviews the literature 
related to the efficient market hypothesis and its rela­
tionship to the financial statement data. Also, evidence 
on segmental information based on empirical research is 
further discussed in this chapter. Chapter three con­
sists of the methodology. Different statistical tools 
are used to examine the differences between the experi­
mental and the control samples. The evaluation of 
annual reports and classification of the experimental 
group as the high-quality and the low-quality disclosure 
groups are discussed. In Chapter four the results and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1C
analysis of findings are discussed. Chapter five con- 
consists of the summary, the conclusions, the limitations 
and the recommendations for further research. The next 
chapters present a review of the literature and relates 
the previous studies to the problem investigated.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Chapter 2
REVIEW OF PREVIOUS RESEARCH
The Effficient Market Hypot "sis and Financial Statement 
Data
The reaction of the securities market to the finan­
cial statement data has been empirically investigated by
1
many researchers, Fama defines capital market efficiency 
as one in which market prices fully reflect all informa­
tion at that time. Fama's work serves as a major fotinda-i
tion of much of the market related research. Ball and 
2Brown examined the capital market reaction to tirms with 
positive earnings changes as compared to firms with nega­
tive earnings changes. They concluded that the securi-
3ties market reacts to the annual income report. Beaver 
studied the price and trading volume reaction to annual 
financial statement announcements, and his results sub­
stantially supported the Ball and Brown study.
1
Fama, E. F. , "The Behavior of Stock Market Prices," 
Journal of Business, (January, 1955), pp. 34-105.
OBall, R. and Brown, P., "An Empirical Evaluation 
of Accounting Income Numbers." Journal of Accounting 
Research, (Autumn, 1968), pp. 159-178.
3Beaver, W. H. , "The Information Content of Annual 
Earnings Announcements." Empirical Research in
11
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In addition, Chatlos^, Dyckman et. al."*, Foster^, Beaver^,
8 9 -̂0 11Foster , Taylor , Patell , and Spangler have provided
support that the capital market react to publicly avail­
able information such as the annual financial reports.
Accounting: Selected Studies, 1968. Supplement to Journal
of Accounting Research, (1968), pp. 67-92.
^Chatlos, R. J. , "Inside Information and the Analyst." 
In S. N. Levine (ed.) Financial Analyst1s Handbook 
1-Portfolio Management, Irwin, Homewood, Illinois, 1976, 
pp. 74-86.
^Dyckman, Thomas, David H. Downes and Robert P.
Magee, Efficient Capital Market and Accounting: A Critical
Analysis: Prentice-Hall, Incorporated, Englewood Cliffs,
New Jersey, 1975, pp. 5-7.
fiFoster, George, Financial Statement Analysis, 
Prentice-Hall, Incorporated, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 
1978.
^Beaver, W. H. , "What Should be the FASB's Objective?" 
The Journal of Ac cotint ancy, (August, 1973), pp. 49-56.
g
Foster, George, "Quarterly Accounting Data: Time-
Series Properties and Predictive Ability Results," The 
Accounting Review, (January, 1977), pp. 1-21.
9Taylor, R. G., "An Examination of the Evolution 
Content; Utility and Problems of Published Interim Re­
ports," Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of 
Chicago, 1963.
■^Patell, J. M. , "Corporate Forecasts of Earnings per 
Share and Stock Price Behavior: Empirical Tests," Journal
of Accounting Research, (Autumn, 1976), pp. 246-276.
^Spangler, C. W. , "The Effects of Unanticipated 
Changes in Dividends on Security Returns," Unpublished 
Master of Science Thesis, M.I.T., Cambridge, Massachusetts, 
1973.
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The present investigation is based on the assumption of 
the semi-strong form of the efficient market, which 
states that the securities market reacts to publicly 
available financial statement data, which beginning in 
December, 1976 includes information as required by FASB 
Statement Number 14. The previous research supports the 
use of the efficient market assumption. That is, if seg­
mental information is new data to the securities market, 
then the securities market provides a mechanism whereby 
the reaction to segmental disclosures can be evaluated.
Of more importance to this proposition is whether the 
quality of disclosures play a vital role in the assess­
ment of systematic risk. These two propositions have 
been tested.
The Evidence of the previous research on the seg­
mental information of the Securities and Exchange Com- 
mssion is discussed helow.
The Kinney Study 
1 )Kinney investigated the relative predictive ability 
of segment versus consolidated data in estimating future 
total-entity earnings of diversified companies. Kinney
^Kinney, W. R. , Jr., "Predicting Earnings: Entity
versus Subentity Data," Journal of Accounting Research, 
(Spring, 1971), pp. 127-136.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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analyzed twenty-six firms that disclosed segment revenue 
and profit data in their annual reports for 1968 and 1969. 
By using four expectation models, he found that segment- 
based predictions of 1968 and 1969 consolidated earnings 
had significantly smaller average absolute prediction 
errors than did predictions based on historical consoli­
dated earnings figures. Kinney cautioned against gener­
alization of the results, since there could be other rea­
sons which made the diversified firms disclose their 
segmental data voluntarily and since the segmental report­
ing disclosures were not required at the time of his study.
The Collins Study 
13Collins extended and updated the preliminary work 
of Kinney. Collins used data disclosed under the line-of- 
business reporting requirements of the SEC imposed in 
1970. He identified ninety-six firms which provided seg­
ment revenue and profit data from 1967 through 1970 from 
1970 Form 10-K reports., By using several times series 
models^ Collins found that segmental-based procedures
13Collins, Daniel W., "Predicting Earnings with 
Subentity Data: Some Further Evidence," Journal of
Accounting Research, (Spring, 1976), pp. 163-177.
^For further discussion of the time series models 
used by Collins, see Journal of Accounting Research, 
Volume 14, (Spring, 1976), pp. 163-177.
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appeared to out perform the consolidated-based methods in 
predicting levels of eamirigs. This result is consistent 
with Kinney's earlier findings. Collins concluded that:
The predictive ability results presented in this 
study generally corroborate Kinney's earlier 
findings which were based on segment data volun­
tarily disclosed in the published annual reports. 
The evidence suggests the SEC product-line revenue 
and profit disclosures together with industry 
sales projections published in various government 
sources provide significantly more accurate esti­
mates of future total-entity sales and earnings 
than those procedures that rely totally on con­
solidated data (p. 175).
The Singhvi and Desai Study
15Singhvi and Desai investigated the quality of cor­
porate financial statement disclosures and related the 
quality to other characteristics of the firms. They ran­
domly selected 100 listed companies and 55 unlisted cor­
porations for fiscal years ending between April, 1965, 
and March 31, 1966, from the 500 largest U.S. industrial 
corporations included in the Fortune's 500 Directory of 
1965. They used a systematic sampling procedure to 
select the annual reports of unlisted corporations from 
the National Over-the-Counter quotations of the 800 
corporations published in the New York Times.
Singhvi and Desai evaluated the quality of corporate 
disclosures in the annual reports (between April, 1965
ISSinghvi and Desai, o£. cit.
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and March 31, 1966) by using an index of disclosure with
16
thirty-four items. The items were taken from Cerf who 
selected the items in the index on the basis of a study 
of the investment decision process, a review of the 
literature, interviews with security analysts, and an 
examination of analysts' reports. Weights were assigned 
to the items in order to note differences in their rela­
tive importance. The total weights given to all items 
equaled sixty-eight.
The quality of disclosure in annual reports was 
quantified by assigning disclosure scores for each item. 
The corporations were classified according to the total 
disclosure scores. A multivariate analysis was used to 
test the significance of the relationship between the 
quality of disclosure and various characteristics. It 
is important to note that Singhvi and Desai made the 
assumption that the quality of disclosure in annual re­
ports is not by itself an independent variable; it is 
very likely to be influenced by several variables.
Their study focused on investigating a relationship 
between quality disclosure and asset size, number of
16Cerf, Alan R., "Corporate Reporting and Investment 
Decisions," The University of California Press, 1961, 
pp. 25-27.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
17
stockholders, listing status, CPA firms, rate of return, 
and earnings margin. Singhvi and Desai concluded that:
Corporations which disclose inadequate informa­
tion are likely to be: (a) small in size as
measured by total assets, (b) small in size as 
measured by number of stockholders, (c) free 
from listing requirements, (d) audited by a 
small CPA firm, (e) less profitable as measured 
by rate of return, and (f) less profitable as 
measured by earnings margin.
They also concluded that:
Inadequate corporate disclosure in annual reports 
is likely to widen fluctuations in the market 
price of a security since investment decisions, 
in the absence of adequate information, are based 
on less objective measures (p. 137).
The significance of the Singhvi and Desai study is 
that the quality of corporate disclosures could be evalu­
ated, and that quality related to financial and market 
characteristics of the firm could be measured. A second 
major point is that the variables they related to the 
quality of disclosure must be held constant if differ­
ences in disclosure quality are to be studied. There­
fore, in studying the market effect of difference in 
the quality of segmental disclosures, the effect of ex­
traneous variables must be held constant.
The Kochanek Study
Kochanek  ̂ investigated the securities market re­
actions for diversified firms which have adopted
1 ̂Kochanek, oj>. cit.
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alternative segmental financial disclosure practices. He 
selected thirty-seven diversified December 31 fiscal 
year firms. The annual financial reports of the firms 
were obtained and surveyed for the years 1966, 1967, 1968 
and 1969. A review of the literature by Kochanek re­
vealed the types of segmental disclosures that were gen­
erally agreed upon by past researchers as useful to the 
investors and financial analysts. Kochanek divided the 
types of segmental disclosures into four levels:
(1) descriptive, (.2) segment sales, (3) segment income, 
(4) segment assets. He assigned an approximately equal 
number of possible points to each level so as not to 
give disproportionate consideration to a particular item 
of disclosure. Kochanek did not make any judgment as 
to whether or not segment earnings data, for instance, 
were proportionately more or less useful to investors 
than segment sales. Instead, the desirability of the 
presence of segmental data was measured in three degrees: 
none, partial, and satisfactory. A matrix description 
of the segmental reporting characteristics is presented 
in Table 2.1.
According to the results of the survey conducted 
by Kochanek, twenty-four firms out of thirty-seven 
firms disclosed at least the minimum desired amount of 
subentity detail consisting of complete segment de­
scriptions and corresponding gross revenues. These
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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TABLE 2.1 
Degree of Segmental Disclosure
Type of






1. List of Segments 0 1 2 2
2. Segment Description 0 1 2 2
3. Segment Companies 0 1 2 2
4. Segment Products 0 1 2 2
5. Future Segment 
Plans 0 1 2 2
6. New Acquisitions 0 2 2
n
Level 2, Segment Sales:
Tabular ($) 0 4 10 10
Chart of Graph 0 2 8 -
Correspond with 
Segment Descrip­
tion 0 1 2 2
T Z
Level 3, Segment Income:
Tabular ($) 0 4 10 10
Basis for Income 
Computation 0 - 2 2
U
Level 4, Segment Assets:
Segment Capital 
Expenditures 0 2 5 5
Segment Assets 0 2 5 5
TU
Continued on next page.
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TABLE 2.1 continued




Comparison of Data: 
(Sales & Income)
1 year
2 - 5  years
6 years or longer
Satis- Maximum 




Maximum possible 1 year
score 49
Maximum possible 4 year
score (49X4) 196
Source: Kochanek, R. "Segmental Financial Disclosure and
Security Prices," The Accounting Review,
(April, 1974), p. 249.
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twenty-four firms qualified as good reporters. Based on 
the results of his study, a score of 94 was the minimum cut­
off point for good reporters. The survey scores ranged 
from a low of 20 to a high of 181, out of a possible 196 
points. Six firms out of twenty-four good reporters were 
classified as superior reporters. The scores for these 
firms ranged from 166 to 181. Thirteen firms were classi­
fied as "poor" reporters. The scores of these firms 
ranged from 20 to 80.
The author presented four models to evaluate the rela­
tionship between segmental financial disclosure and earn­
ings predictability. The four models were referred to as 
long term, January 1, 1969 to January 1, 1970; intermedi­
ate, January 1, 1970 to June, 1970; short term,'Jdly 1,
1970 to January 1, 1971; and current, January 1, 1971 to 
April, 1971. Kochanek stated that:
The purpose of these models was to deter­
mine if firms disclosing subentity data 
had greater earnings predictability than 
firms not revealing such information.
Earnings predictability was measured by 
correlations between changes in annual 
reported earnings per share figures and 
changes in stock prices computed over 
time periods which preceded (led), and 
succeeded (lagged) the earnings change 
observation year (p. 251).
The Kochanek study is significant in that he provided a 
mechanism for measuring the quality of segmental dis­
closures which has been modified and employed in this
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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study. His results suggest that there is a market re­
sponse to the quality of segmental disclosures. By pro­
viding more control of extraneous variables, the market 
reaction to the quality of segmental disclosures may be 
more clearly identified. The Kochanek study provides a 
major basis for the study reported in later chapters. 
Kochanek's results suggest that segmental disclosure re­
sults aid investors in anticipating future earnings 
changes in the valuation of securities. The stock market 
reactions to current earnings announcements would be 
stronger for poor reporters than for good reporters. Also, 
his results indicated that in the absence of segmental 
information, the investors reacted more to current infor­
mation sources, such as new releases and quarterly 
earnings announcements. In conclusion, the hypothesis 
that sample firms with good segmental disclosure would 
exhibit the same distribution of computed weekly stock 
price variability ratios as firms with poor segmental 
disclosure was rejected. Kochanek cautioned against 
possible bias because he did not control extraneous 
variables which may have affected his results.
The Beston Study
18Contrary to the studies discussed above, Beston 
examined the effect of the disclosure requirements of
1 ftBeston, G. , "Required Disclosure and the Stock Mar­
ket: An Evaluation of the Securities Exchange Act of
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the SEC Act of 1934. He examined the effects of the re­
quired disclosure of sales, since analysts considered sales 
very important. By using a risk-retum linear model, he 
concluded that there was no measurable effect between the 
residuals of the companies that did or did not disclose 
their sales. He further stated that disclosure of sales 
figures would not add any information to the financial 
statements once profit is known.
The Horwitz and Kolodny Study
19A study made by Horwitz and Kolodny examined the im­
pact of line-of-business reporting required by the SEC 
in 1970, on the securities market. By using the capital 
asset pricing model, Horwitz and Kolodny selected two 
samples - one experimental group (the line-of-business 
reporting sample) called LOBUR sample, and the control 
group (the non-line-of-business reporting sample) called 
non-LOBUR. One hundred firms were randomly selected.
Fifty LOBUR firms which provided segmental data in their 
1969 annual reports were selected from 1969 edition of 
Accounting Trends and Techniques. The fifty non-LOBUR 
firms were selected from the SEC reports. Data on the 
two samples were taken from the COMPUSTAT Price
1934," The American Economic Review, Volume 63, Number 1, 
(March, “If 7 3), pp. 132-155.
1 9 Howritz and Kolodny, o£. cit.
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Dividends Earnings file. A time period of nine years was 
divided into three subperiods:
(1) 1965-1970 period - this is the period before
the change in the reporting requirement (pre­
disclosure period);
(.2) 1971 period - the one-year period surrounding
the time in which the change in the reporting 
requirement took effect (disclosure period), and 
(.3) 1972-1973 period - two-year period, following
the change in the reporting requirement (post 
disclosure),
A A + *By using the market model, R ± t + Pi Rmt + ^Pit»
Horwitz and Kolodny evaluated whether shifts in per­
ceived market risk as measured by beta during the dis­
closure period were significantly greater for LOBUR 
firms than for non-LOBUR firms. By estimating the 
average absolute beta for the three periods indicated, 
they concluded that shifts in market risk around the 
time of disclosure were no greater for LOBUR firms than 
for non-LOBUR firms. The authors further concluded that 
shifts in market risk provide no evidence that LOBUR 
information affected the level of market risk perceived 
by the investors.
The authors further measured the unexpected returns 
that were realized on the securities of the LOBUR fifms 
close to the time that the additional information was
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disclosed. Specifically, the issue was whether the newly 
discovered line-of-business data ldd to a reassessment of 
value of reporting firms by investors. The results of 
the residual analysis provided no evidence that LOBUR re­
porting affected security prices.
Even though the Horwitz and Kolodny study suggested 
that there was no market reaction to segmental data as 
required by the SEC, an investigation of the market effect 
of the FASB's segmental disclosures is still warranted.
The FASB's disclosure requirements are more extensive 
than the SEC's requirements which Horwitz and Kolodny 
studied.
The Simonds and Collins Study
20Simonds and Collins also investigated the risk- 
information effects of LOBUR disclosure. Their study was 
divided into two parts. The first part replicated the 
Horwitz and Kolodny study; the second part examined the 
movement of BETA Coefficients from April, 1968 to 
December, 1974. Simonds and Collins identified LOBUR 
firms as those having segmental disclosures in annual 
reports registration statements, or proxy statements 
issued prior to filing of their 1970 10-K reports with 
the SEC. The types of segmental disclosure by indivi­
dual firms in their 1967-1970 annual reports were
Simonds and Collins, oj>. cit.
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obtained from Accounting Trends and Techniques. The monthly 
return data on the CRSP tapes for the time period of Octo­
ber, 1965 through July, 1974 were obtained for 215 firms. 
These firms were classified into three groups. The first 
group was called Multisegment Treatment Group (MST). It 
consisted of 78 firms. The MST group provided the most 
extensive segmental disclosures. The second group, Multi­
segment Control Group (MCG) consisted of 70 firms. Those 
firms that had no or limited segmental disclosure (seg­
ment revenue disclosure only) in the annual reports, 
prospectus, or proxy statements in the period 1967-1970 
prior to initiation of SEC LOBUR in the 1970 10-K. The 
third group was called the Single-Segment Control Group 
(SSC) which consisted of 67 firms. The characteristic 
of this group was that the firms did not have segmental 
disclosure either before or after initiation of SEC 
LOBUR in the 1970 10-K. The firms in each group were 
identified by three-digit Standard Industrial Classifi­
cation Codes (SIC).
The focus of this study was to compare relative 
changes in beta (from pre-LOBUR to post-LOBUR) for treat­
ment versus control groups. By using the market model, 
Simonds and Collins calculated moving-beta estimates (Bir ) 
for each of the three groups. The results of the tests 
indicated a significant downward drift in the beta level
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of the multi-segment treatment group with the most dra­
matic shift occurring within the designated critical peri­
od, which is eight months after the initiation of the 
SEC LOBUR reporting for registration statements and twelve 
months before the initial disclosure of LOBUR data in the 
1970 10-K reports. On the other hand, the average betas 
of the multi-segment and single-segment control groups 
indicated considerable stability overall with little 
change within the designated critical period.
The authors investigated the observed beta changes 
for each of the three groups by using the analysis of 
covariance (ANCOVA) procedure. The results of the ANCOVA 
tests strongly confirmed the previous result that the 
multi-segment treatment group portfolio (MST) experienced 
a significant shift in beta while the Multi-segment con­
trol group (MSC) and single-segment control group (SSC) 
indicated no significant beta change during the desig­
nated critical period. The authors concluded that:A
The fact that the beta change lor the MST 
portfolio appears to have occurred before 
March, 1971, suggest that SEC LOBUR data 
were being developed and disseminated to 
the market well in advance of the-time 
that such data were published as part of 21 
the registrant's 1970 10-K reports (p. 653).
21
Ibid.
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Using the Horwitz and Kolodny procedures and comparing MST 
and MSC or MST and SSC, the authors did not reject the null 
hypothesis of no difference between the treatment group 
and the control group. Neither was it rejected when they 
used the standard F-test for equality of variances. How­
ever, the authors pointed out that if the t-tests were 
conducted using the raw beta changes, significant test 
statistics would have been obtained.
Generally the above studies, with the exception of 
Horwitz and Kolodny, support the assumption that the 
securities market reacts to segmental disclosure re­
quired by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) . 
Also, research shows that sub-entity financial statements 
are better predictors of future earnings than the consoli­
dated earnings. The majority of the above studies em­
pirically support the proposition ^nat segmental dis­
closures are important to investors and provide a founda­
tion for this study.
THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE PREVIOUS STUDIES TO THE PRESENT 
STUDY
As mentioned above, the variables mentioned by 
22Singhvi and Desai were used in this study as the
22
Singhvi and Desai, o£. cit.
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discriminating variables among others to examine the dif­
ferences between the quality of disclosures based on the
23 24firms' financial attributes. Samples in the Kochanek
study lacked homogeneity. He did not control or attempt
to extract the extraneous variables in order to achieve
25homogeneity of the sample. Also, Horwitz and Kolodny,
26
Beston studies did not have a control group or did not
attempt to control for extraneous variables. Simonds and 
27Collins study is superior to the others in that they 
included treatment and the control groups, although con­
trol and treatment groups were not sufficient to suppres 
the influence of extraneous variables. Other procedures 
can be used to further remove effects of extraneous 
variables.
One of the main motivations of this investigation 
was to use different statistical tools to control or 
eliminate extraneous or confounding variables that may 
make the results or findings of any empirical research
J
suspect. The first step in controlling for the
23A detailed discussion on the financial attri­
butes can be found on page 57.
24 ^ ,Kochanek, op. cit.
25Horwitz and Kolodny, o£. cit,
^Beston, o£. cit.
^Simonds and Collins, oj>. cit.
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extraneous variable was to carefully select the experi­
mental sample firms. The major point of investigation 
is that if any difference in systematic risk does occur 
because of the quality of segmental disclosure, it 
should be the effect of differences in segmental dis­
closure. Measures of control were imposed on the experi­
mental group by examining whether the firms in the group 
were homogenous across attributes other than segmental 
disclosures. The previous studies discussed above did 
not use the measures employed in this study to control 
for the extraneous variables. The next chapter discus­
ses in detail the methodology used in this study and 
the measures employed to control extraneous effects.
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CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
This chapter describes the research methodology em­
ployed in the study. The first section discusses the 
research sample and its characteristics. The second 
section presents the significance of the systematic risk 
and its relationship to accounting variables. The third 
section discusses the statistical methods employed in 
this study. The fourth section presents the evaluation 
design. The final section discusses the methodology 
used to extract extraneous variables.
The Research Sample
Three hundred diversified companies were selected 
from the Value-Line tape and Investment Survey Records 
of 1978. The companies selected had the following 
characteristics:
(1) total assets must be equal to or greater 
than $500 million,
(2) the rates of return (Net Earnings/Total In­
vestment) must be five percent and above, and
(3) the earnings margin must be three percent or 
more.
31
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These criteria represent one method used to achieve homo­
geneity among the diversified firms so as to control the 
effect of these variables on the systematic risk.
One hundred and fifty diversified companies of the 
three hundred firms reported segmental data in their 1978 
annual reports as required by the FASB Statement Number 
14. They represent the experimental group. The remain­
ing one hundred and fifty firms reported only consolidated 
statements in their 1978 annual reports. These firms did 
not meet the FASB Statement: Number 14 requirements in 
1978 and as such were not required to report segmental 
disclosures. The one hundred and fifty non-segmental 
reporting firms comprise the control group (See Appendix 
C).
The main purpose of having a control group is to 
find the difference in the systematic risk of the diver­
sified firms that reported segmental data and those 
diversified firms that were not required to report seg­
mental data. A priori reasoning would suggest that the 
more information a firm disseminates about the operating 
performances of its segments, the lower will be the sys­
tematic risk of the firm, all other factors being equal. 
Kinney'*’ indirectly supported this hypothesis by reporting 
that segment-based predictions of consolidated earnings
1
Kinney, W. R., o£. cit.
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had significantly smaller average absolute prediction 
errors than did predictions based on historical consoli­
dated earnings figures. Other evidence that supported
2this assertion was provided by Collins. He found that 
segmental-based procedures appeared to dominate the 
consolidated-based procedures in predicting levels of 
earnings.
OSimonds and Collins empirically assessed the risk- 
information effects of Line-of-Business disclosures by 
testing three groups: Multisegment Treatment Group,
Multisegment Control Group and Single-Segment Control 
Group. The authors compared relative changes in beta 
(from pre-LOBUR to post-LOBUR) for treatment versus con­
trol groups. The results of their tests indicated a 
significant downward drift in the beta level of the 
Multisegment Treatment Group with the most dramatic 
shift occurring within the designated critical period - 
the disclosure period.
^Collins, D. W. , o]3. cit.
3For further study on Simonds and Collins, see 
Chapter 2.
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SYSTEMATIC RISK (MARKET BETA)
The measure of systematic risk used in the study is 
the systematic risk (the market beta) from the tradi- 
tional market model, Rit + J-jRmt + J^it- ^it i-s the re"
turn on security i in period t. is the return on the 
market portfolio in period t. The market betas for therthree 
hundred companies-were taken from the Value Line tapes.
By definition, market beta is expressed as follows:
Cov(Ri ’V
f m= ....... ................ (1)
Var(Rm)
Where p 111 is the systematic risk. Cov(R^,Rm ) is the 
covariance of the individual return of a firm in time 
t and the market return in time t; Var(Rm ) is the vari­
ance of the market return in time t.
4The Value Line betas are derived from a least- 
squares regression analysis between weekly percent 
changes in the price of stock and weekly percent changes
^Value-Line User's Manual, 1978 Edition, Chapter 7, 
page 18,
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in the New York Stock Exchange Composite Index over a
5
period of five years.
The betas in the Value Line base are adjusted for 
non-stationarity. Since high beta stocks may decrease 
over time, and low beta stocks may increase over time, 
the adjustment for nonstationarity of the calculated 
market betas is important. The adjustment for nonsta­
tionarity of beta is necessary so that changes in beta 
that are investigated are due to real economic events 
and not to general upward or downward trends in the beta 
itself. Since the investor is interested in the ex­
pected risk of his portfolio over a time period, it is 
important to examine the stability of beta over time.
g
Sharpe and Cooper examined this issue by estimat­
ing the betas of securities for each year from 1931 to 
1969, The data were collected from the CRSP file. The 
betas in each year were ranked from highest to lowest 
and placed in ten risk-retum classes. The first risk- 
retum class comprised those securities with the high­
est estimated betas over the past 60 months. This pro­
cedure was repeated each year. The authors then com­
puted the percentage of stocks remaining in the same
5The Five-year period is from 1973 to 1978.
(LSharpe, W. F., and Cooper, G. M. , "Risk-Retum 
Classes of New York Stock Exchange Common Stocks, 1931 
to 1969,” Financial Analysts Journal, (March-April, 1972), 
pp. 46-54.
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risk-retum class in adjacent one-year and five-year 
periods. If the relative rankings of betas were stable 
over time, each firm would remain in the same risk- 
retum class. They found that there is more instability 
in adjacent five-year rankings of beta than in adjacent 
one-year periods. The results obtained suggest that at 
the individual security level, there is nontrivial in­
stability in estimated betas over time. Beaver et. al.^ 
also concluded that there is considerably more stability 
in the estimated betas of portfolios over time. They 
reported that the Spearman Rank Corporation between ad­
jacent betas of 307 NYSE stocks for the 1947-1956 and 
1957-1965 periods were .626 at the individual security 
level, .875 at the 5-security portfolio level, and .989
at the 20-security portfolio level.
8Beaver and Manegold examined the association be­
tween market-determined and accounting-determined risk 
measures. They estimated the security market beta for
Beaver, et. al., "The Association Between Market 
Determined and Accounting Determined Risk Measures."
The Accounting Review, (October, 1970), p. 669.
g
Beaver, W. H. , and Manegold, J., "The Association 
Between Market Determined and Accounting Determined 
Measures of Systematic Risk: Some Further Evidence."
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, (June, 
1975) ',  ppT 231- 785".----------- --------------------------------------
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254 firms from the monthly returns over the 1951-1969 
period. The Spearman Rank Correlations for the net in­
come/total assets and net income/net worth were separately 
examined. The Spearman Rank Correlations between the 
securities market beta and each of the accounting vari­
ables are presented in Table 3.1.
TABLE 3.1











Total Assets .41 .60 .69
Net Income
Net Worth .46 .69 .74
The authors concluded that there is a strong significant
association between the securi-j.es market and the account-
9ing based estimates of beta. The Ball and Brown study 
supported the above results. Ball and Brown used the 
Spearman Rank Correlation to find a relationship between
Ball and Brown, op. cit.
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securities market beta and operating income, net income 
and net income available for common stocks, respectively. 
The results indicated a significant correlation between 
securities market and accounting-based estimates of beta.
In summary, previous research has demonstrated a 
significant empirical relationship between a firm's 
systematic risk and certain accounting variables discussed 
on the previous page. Based on previous research, investi­
gating the relationship of the systematic risk with ac­
counting information (i.e. disclosure of segment data) 
is appropriate.
Since the three hundred diversified firms were di­
vided into an experimental group with segmental dis­
closures and a control group without segmental disclosures, 
the first problem investigated was the difference in 
systematic risk between the two groups. That is, does 
the disclosure of segmental information itself affect 
systematic risk?
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample test was con­
ducted to test the difference between the cumulative dis­
tributions of the betas of the experimental and the con­
trol groups. Also, a t-test statistic was conducted to 
examine the differences between the mean betas of the 
two samples.
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THE RESEARCH DESIGN
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov Two-Sample Test
The main focus of this section is to examine the re­
lationship between the experimental and the control 
groups. To conduct this test, the non-parametric Kolmo- 
gorov-Smimov two-sample test was used to test the null 
hypothesis that two independent samples were drawn from 
the same population or from a population with the same 
distribution. A two-tail test was used to test the sensi­
tivity of the difference in the distributions from which 
the two samples were drawn (i.e., differences in location, 
central tendency, in dispersion, or in skewness). If 
the two samples have been drawn from the same population, 
the cumulative distributions of both samples are ex­
pected to be close to each other because both samples 
will be showing only random deviations from the popula­
tion distribution. If the two-sample cumulative distri­
butions are significantly different at any point, the 
two samples come from different populations. Thus,
significant deviation between the two-sample cumulative
10distributions will reject the null hypothesis.
Seigel, Nonparametric Statistics for the Behavi­
oral Sciences, McGraw-Hill in Psychology, New York, 
Toronto, London, 1956.
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Testing Procedures
To apply this test, a cumulative frequency distribu­
tion for each sample of observations (control and experi­
mental) was made by using the same intervals for both 
distributions. For each interval, one step was subtracted 
from the other, the result is the deviation, which is 
called "D". The test focused on the largest of these 
observed deviations (D's). For example, D = Maximum 
Sni(X).Sn2(x) ^  where D is the deviation in each obser­
vation, Sn ^(X) is the observed cumulative step function 
of group one, and S^Cx) is the observed cumulative step 
function of group two.
The systematic risk is the observed variable. The 
interval between the lowest and the highest risk measure 
of market beta for the experimental and the control 
groups was 0.55 and 1.80. The two-sample beta intervals 
were divided into six intervals: (1) 0.55 to 0.86,
(2) 0.87 to 0.97, (3) 0.98 to 1.18, (4) 1.19 to 1.39,
(.5) 1.40 to 1.60, and (6) 0.61 to 1.80. The blocking is 
based on the frequency of distributions in both samples 
so as to have a representative number of subjects in 
each cell.
n ibid.
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Student's t-test
In addition to the non-parametrie test mentioned on 
the previous page, a student's t-test was conducted in 
calculating the probability associated with the null 
hypothesis that the experimental group has the same beta 
mean as the control group. The t-test is a statistic 
generally applicable to a normally distributed random 
variable where the mean is assumed to be known and the 
population variance is estimated from a sample. The 
t-test provides the probability levels for testing the 
significance of the difference between two-sample means.
The investigator has not made any assumption as to 
the normality of the sample distribution in this study; 
but it is appropriate to test for the difference in the 
means of the two groups by using a parametric statistic 
so as to compare the results obtained with those of the 
non-parametric statistics discussed earlier. The re­
sults of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test and the t-test for 
the experimental and the control groups are discussed in 
Chapter 4.
EVALUATION OF ANNUAL REPORTS DESIGN
Since the primary purpose of the study was to examine 
whether or not the securities market reacts to the 
quality of segmental disclosures of diversified firms, a
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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sixteen-item evaluation design was used to evaluate the 
quality of segmental disclosures in the 1978 annual finan­
cial reports of the experimental sample. The sixteen 
items incorporate the SEC's segmental disclosure rule, 
and more importantly, the segmental disclosure require­
ments of FASB Statement Number 14. The items indicate 
the opinions of financial analysts and the items analysts
would like to be disclosed in the annual financial re- 
12ports.
A review of the literature and the substance of 
the FASB Statement Number 14, revealed the type of seg­
mental disclosures that have been discussed by past 
researchers as useful to investors and financial ana­
lysts. The types of segmental disclosures were divided 
into four categories:
(1) general description of segmental units:
(2) segment sales and expenses;
(.3) segment income (losses) and the tax effect 
on income (losses); and
(4) segment assets.
Points were assigned to the items in each category based
12Bradish, Richard D., "Corporate Reporting and the 
Financial Analysts," The Accounting Review, (October, 
1965), pp. 757-765.
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on their importance to investors, i.e., high quality,
medium quality, and low quality.
Each item in category one carries equal points. The
high quality point is 3, the medium quality point is 2,
and the low quality point is 1. In categories two, three
and four, each item carries different points. The points
assigned to each item depend on the relative importance
of the item to the investors. The high quality points
are from 4 to 10. The medium quality points are from 2
to 8. The low quality points are from 1 to 4. Kochanek^
14
and Singhvi and Desai used a similar methodology. The 
matrix description of the segmental disclosure categories 
is presented in Table 3.2.
13Kochanek, oj). cit.
^Singhvi and Desai, o£. cit.
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TABLE 3.2 
Degree of Segmental Disclosure
WEIGHTS
TYPE OF MAXIMUM
Se g m e n t a l d i s c l o s u r e s h i g h m e d i u m l o w He i g h t s
CATEGORY 1.
GENERAL DESCRIPTION
(1) List of unaffili­ated customers 3 2 1 3
(2) List of segment 
companies 3 2 1 3
(3) List of geographic 
areas 3 2 1 3
(4) Segment products 3 2 1 3
(5) Type of industries 
in the multisegment 3 2 1 3
(.6) Segment information 
presented in per­
centages 3 2 1 3
CATEGORY 2,
SEGMENT SALES AND EXPENSES
(7) In tabular form,
3 yrs., 2 yrs.,
1 yr. 10 8 4
18
10
(8) In chart or graph, 
3 yrs. , 2 yrs. ,
1 yr. 8 6 2 8
(.9) In notes to finan­
cial statements 4 2 1 4
Continued on next page
22
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TABLE 3.2 continued 
Degree of Segmental Disclosure
-WEIGHTS
TYPE OF 'MAXIMUM




(10) In tabular form 10 8 4 10
(11) In chart or graph 8 6 2 8
(12) In notes to finan­
cial statements 4 2 1 42T
CATEGORY 4,
SEGMENT ASSETS AND 
LIABILITIES
(13) Assets presented 
for 3 yrs., 2 yrs.,1 6r. 10 8 4 10
(14) Capital expendi­
tures for 3 yrs.,
2 yrs., 1 yr. 8 6 2 8
(15) Liabilities for
3 yrs., 2 yrs.,
1 yr. 6 3 2 6
(.16) Foreign operations 
for 3 yrs., 2 yrs.,1 yr, 4 3 1 _4
28
TOTAL MAXIMUM POSSIBLE SCORE 90
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In this study, a high quality score of 90 is the 
maximum points a firm could obtain on all the items in 
the evaluation design. For example, a score of 61 indi­
cates a partial disclosure of the items listed in the 
evaluation design, but not presented as fully as those 
firms with higher scores. A score of 29 indicates that 
the firm partially disclosed segmental data but the dis­
closure is not sufficient to provide a basis for meaning­
ful interpretations about the operative performance of 
each segment in the diversified firm,
A disclosure score was calculated by dividing the 
points earned by an individual firm by the maximum points 
available. The maximum score a firm could obtain is one 
hundred percent. For example, if a firm obtains a score 
of 72 out of the maximum score of 90, the firm obtains 
an 80% (72/90) score. This calculation was used for all 
the firms in the experimental sample. The highest per­
centage score was 96%. The lowest percentage score was 
327o. The sample was divided into two equal sized groups 
(the high quality disclosure and the low quality disclo­
sure groups) based on the range of the scores between 
ninety-six percent and thirty-two percent (detailed re­
sults of the evaluation of the annual financial reports 
can be found in Chapter 4). The high quality and low 
quality groups provided the basis for evaluating the 
effect on systematic risk of differences in the quality 
of disclosures.
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STANDARD INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFICATION CODE SCORING SYSTEM
The evaluation design discussed above is subject to
possible bias in that it reflects the judgment of the
15author as well as other researchers. Kochanek used a 
similar design and his results indicated that the design 
was capturing significant information on the quality of 
segmental disclosures. Nevertheless, because the design 
is judgmental, additional support was sought to prove 
that the design would capture significant differences in 
the quality of segmental disclosures. This additional 
support was in the form of a comparison of a Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) Code Scoring procedure 
with the disclosure scores derived from the evaluation 
design.
FASB Statement Number 14 on the segment information
stated that statement users with segmental data can
better appraise a corporation's past performance, future
prospects, and risks than is possible using total enter- 
16prise data. Hawkins suggested that in grouping pro­
ducts or services to form reportable segments, the
15
Kochanek, op. cit.
16AICPA Professional Standards, op. cit.
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Standard Industrial Classification system and/or the 
Enterprise^Standard Industrial Classification system may 
be useful.
If firms reported segments identified, using the SIC 
code system, the number of segments reported in the an­
nual reports, they should parallel the number of different 
industries (SIC code groups) in which the firm operates. 
Therefore, if a firm does not report as many segments as 
different industries in which it operates, the firm may 
be a low quality reporting firm, If the disclosure 
scores and the SIC stores are consistent statistically, 
the disclosure score is capturing the information it is 
supposed to measure, i.e., differences in disclosure 
quality.
The SIC code system defines industries in accord­
ance with the composition and structure of the economy 
and covers the entire field of economic activities. The 
Executive Office of the President - Office of Management 
and Budget lists the general principles in preparing the 
classification of industries into different SIC code 
groups. They are:
Hawkins, David, F., Corporate Financial Reporting, 
Richard D.Irwin, Incorporated, Homewood, Illinois,
1977, p. 689.
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(1) the classification must conform to the 
existing structure of the American in­
dustry;
(2) each establishment must be classified 
according to its primary or dominant 
activity; and
(3) to be recognized as an industry, the 
group of establishments consisting the 
proposed classification must be sta­
tistically significant in the number 
of persons employed, the volume of 
business done and Other measures of 
economic activity.
SIC codes hased on a two-digit, three-digit, and four­
digit level have been developing according to the degree 
of homogeneity of industrial activity among firms. The 
assignment of an industry code to each establishment is 
based on its primary activity, which is determined 
by its principal product or group of products, produced 
or distributed, or services rendered. The difference be­
tween the four-digit code and the three-digit code or 
the two-digit code is the homogeneity of the activity in 
the four-digit category. A four-digit code has greater 
homogeneity of activities within the category than the 
three-digit code category. A three-digit code has more 
homogeneity of industrial activity than the two-digit 
code group. A two-digit code is the least homogeneous
Executive Office of the President - Office of 
Management and Budget, Standard Industrial Classifica­
tion Manual, 1972, p. 9.
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primary activity group. The number of four-digit codes, 
three-digit codes and two-digit codes, respectively, 
were obtained for each sample firm from the Dun and 
Bradstreet One Million Dollar Directory, 1978 Edition 
(See Appendix A ).
The number of the three levels of SIC codes provide 
information as to the number of different types of indus­
trial activities conducted by each firm. For instance, 
a firm with five four-digit codes which operates in 
five industries (according to a four-digit classification 
code) may have fewer industries according to a three- 
digit or a two-digit classification.
A company may use a four-digit code, a three-digit 
code or a two-digit code system in subdividing the firm 
for purposes of reporting segment information in the 
annual reports, The firm that uses a four-digit code 
system in classifying its industries into different 
segments, reports more detailed segment information than 
the firm that uses three-digits or two-digits to deter­
mine segments.
The investigator obtained the number of segments 
disclosed by each firm from the 1978 annual reports.
SIC code scores were calculated by dividing the number 
of reported segments by the number of the three levels 
of SIC codes (a four-digit code, a three-digit code and
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a two-digit code). For example, if a company has five 
four-digit codes, four three-digit codes, and three two- 
digit codes, respectively, and reports four segments in 
the annual reports, the SIC code scores for this firm 
are:
(1) a four-digit code score of 807. (4/5),
(2) a three-digit code score of 100% (4/4), and
(3) a two-digit code score of 133% (4/3).
A company that has five industries according to the 
four-digit codes, but reports four industries in the an­
nual reports, will obtain a lower score than a company 
which has four industries according to the four-digit 
codes and reports four industries in the annual reports.
Appendix A reports the numbers of the different SIC 
code groupings and the scores obtained by dividing the 
number of segments by the number of the SIC codes for 
each firm for each level (four-digit, three-digit and 
two-digit, respectively). Appendix A also shows the 
market beta (systematic risk) for each firm, and the 
number of segments reported in the annual reports.
In finding a relationship between the disclosure 
scores and each of the SIC code scores presented in 
Appendix A, a Spearman Rank Corporation test was con­
ducted to examine whether or not the two scores are 
statistically correlated. The procedure for this test 
is discussed on the following page.
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Spearman Rank Correlation Test
Spearman Rank Correlation is a measure of the rela­
tionship between two or more variables. The purpose of 
this test was to find whether or not disclosure scores 
(called Q4) as measured by evaluating the segmental dis­
closures in the annual reports is correlated with SIC 
code scores for four-digits, three-digits, and two-digits, 
respectively. If the relation between the two sets of 
scores are perfect, then the deviation between the two 
sets of scores will be zero. The larger the deviations, 
the less perfect will be the correlation between the two 
variables. The deviation was statistically calculated 
by finding the difference between the segmental disclosure 
score for each firm and its four-digit code score, three- 
digit code score and two-digit code score, respectively. 
The result was squared to remove the negative signs.
T ie deviation which is presented by d^ was computed as 
follows:
d± = Xi-Yi ........................... (2) , where,
= SIC code score for four-digit, three-digit 
or two digit SIC codes.
Y^ = Disclosure score obtained from the annual 
reports evaluation.
d^ = The difference of the two variables.
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19The formula for the Spearman Rank Correlation is 
as follows:
N
rs = 1 . 6 £  
n3-n
The Statistical Analysts System (SAS) procedure was 
used to compute the Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficients 









19Seigel, Non-parametric Statistics for the Behavi­
oral Sciences, McGraw-Hill Series in Psychology, New York, 
Toronto, London, 1956, pp. 127-28.
20Statistical Analysts System, User1s Manual, North 
Carolina, 1971, p. 200.
(3)
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ANALYSIS OF THE DISCLOSURE SCORES
Analysis of Variance Procedure ;
The disclosure scores were used to divide the ex-
and the low quality disclosure group based on the results 
of the annual reports evaluation. The median disclosure 
score was used to divide the experimental sample into 
two groups. The firms with the disclosure scores from 
70% to 967, were classified as the high quality disclo­
sure group, and those with the disclosure scores from 
32% and 69% were classified as the low quality disclosure 
group.
Each group was tested for homogeneity of the dis­
closure scores, A one-way Analysis of Variance procedure 
was applied. The one-way ANOVA is based on the realiza­
tion that there are two ways to calculate the population 
variance from sample data. Since there are two ways to 
estimate the same variance, the value for the F ratio 
formed by the two estimates will vary from one, by chance 
alone, if the data came from one population with a mean
came from populations which have different means and a 
common variance, the F ratio formed by the two variance 
estimates will tend to be greater than one, indicating
perimental group into the high quality disclosure group
If however, the sample data
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21more than one population. The results of this test can 
be found in Chapter 4.
Multiple Discriminant Analy^l^
While the sample observations have been divided into 
two groups based on disclosure quality, other variables 
may affect the systematic risk of firms. Systematic 
risk may be affected by the size of assets, liquidity, 
cash-flow, price/earnings ratio, dividend yield, earnings 
to net worth, earnings margin, leverage and rate of return. 
If this is the case, the sample may suffer from lack of 
precision and weaknesses identified in the previous 
studies. To be confident that the sample was homogeneous 
and that the influences of extraneous variables did not 
bias this investigation, financial variables of the two 
groups other than the quality of segmental disclosures 
were tested for significance differences.
The purpose of dividing the diversified firms into 
two groups according to the quality of segmental dis­
closures is to investigate whether high quality firms 
have lower systematic risk than the low quality 
firms.
Cangelosi, V. E. , Phillip H. Taylor, Philip F. 
Rice, Basic Statistics: A Real World Approach, West
Publishing Company, St. Paul, New York, Los Angeles, 
San Francisco, Boston, 1976, p. 165.
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Many factors may contribute to the systematic risk 
of the firms. Among these factors are various financial 
variables. There is considerable evidence that supports 
the assertion that financial ratios are related to the 
systematic risk of firms. Previous research has indi­
cated the following financial variables affect the sys­
tematic risk (Market beta): (1) Current Assets/current
liabilities, (2) Size, (3) Cashflow per share, (4) Price/ 
Earnings, (5) Divident yield, (6) Divident payout,
(7) Earnings to Net Worth, (8) Earnings to net capital 
expenditures, (9) Leverage, (10) Earnings margin,
22
(11) Taxes to Net Profit, and (12) Growth in earnings.
These financial variables were taken from the 
Value Line Survey Records, 1978 Edition. The defini­
tions of the variables are presented in Table 3.3 on 
the next page (See also Appendix B for detailed presen­
tation) .
22Foster, George, o£. cit.
















Definition of Financial Variables
Genetic names and definitions
CA/CL is the current assets divided by current 
liabilities.
Size is measured by the total sales.
Cashflow per share is the Net Cashflow 
divided by the common stock at the end 
of the year.
Price/Eamings is the price per share divided 
by the earnings per share.
Dividend yield is the dividend per share 
divided by price per share.
Divident payout is the divident per share 
divided by earnings per share.
Earnings to Net Worth is the net earnings 
divided by Net Worth.
Earnings to Net Capital Expenditures is the 
earnings divided by Net Capital expenditures.
Leverage is total long-term debts divided by 
equity.
Earnings margin is the net income divided by 
the total investment.
Taxes to net profit is the total amount of 
taxes paid divided by net profit,
Growth in earnings is the annual growth rate 
in EPS for five years compounded.
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An appropriate statistical approach to examine if two or 
more groups are homogenous on multiple variables is the 
Multiple Discriminant Analysis (MDA) . The main objective 
of using MDA is to investigate whether the high quality 
group and the low quality group are different on the 
above financial variables.
MDA was employed to determine and identify which 
discriminant (Predictor) variables exhibit significant 
differences between the high and the low quality disclosure 
groups. The twelve financial variables discussed above 
served as predictor variables (Xj) to calculate a linear 
combination of those predictor variables that maximally 
differentiated the two groups of firms. The linear com­
bination (Y) was expressed as a function of the predictor
variables (X.) and a set of combining weights (V.): ̂ J
n n = 1 .....  75




Discriminant analysis identifies the maximum sepa­
ration between groups by forming one or more linear 
combinations of discriminating variables. The discrimi­
nant function is presented as follows:
Di = dilZl + di2Z2 + ..........  + dipZp ....... (5)
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D is the score on discriminant function i, and d's are i
weighting coefficients, and the Z's are the standard ■ 
values of the P discriminating variables used in the 
analysis. The discriminant criterion (/| ) is a function 
of the variances between and within groups:
Also, this equation can be expressed as the sums of squares 
and cross products matrices (SSCP) and the combining 
weight matrices (V):
V'SSCP V w
The Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) computer 
procedure was employed for this statistical test. SPSS 
performs discriminant analysis either by entering all dis­
criminating variables directly into the analysis (DIRECT 
METHOD) or through a stepwise method. This method selects 
the best set of discriminating variables. The criterion 
for controlling the stepwise selection in this study was 
the minimum "MAHALANOBIS" distance between groups. The
Sums of squares between (b) groups
Sums of squares within (w) groups
V'SSCP^Vb
(7)
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largest minimum F between groups is the largest increase
23in average multiple correlation.
If the MDA test results indicate that the two 
groups are similar based on their financial characteris­
tics, the only difference between the two groups is the 
quality of disclosures. However, if the test results 
indicate that the two groups are different on the finan­
cial variables used in the MDA, financial variables may 
play a part in dividing the sample into high quality and 
low quality groups. If this is the case, the associa­
tions between the financial variables (that entered the 
discriminant function) and the systematic risk (Market 
beta) must be investigated so as to know the effect of 
these variables on the systematic risk. If the correla­
tion between the financial variables (that entered the 
discriminant function) is low, their effect on the sys­
tematic risk will be low. Their ability to separate 
the two groups into high quality and low quality groups 
will be minimal.
Two statistical approaches were employed to examine 
the correlation between the financial variables (used in
^ N i e  et. al. , Statistical Package for Social 
Sciences, New York, 1975, p. 435.
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the MDA test) and the systematic risk. The first approach 
employed the Stepwise Multiple Regression Analysis and 
the second approach employed the Spearman Rank Correla­
tion. Both statistical approaches are discussed below.
Stepwise Multiple Regression Analysis
In order to be confident that the financial vari­
ables that enter the discriminant function of the Multiple 
Discriminant Analysis did not pose any problem to the 
homogeneity of the two groups; a Stepwise Multiple Re­
gression test was conducted. The betas of the experimental 
group were identified as the dependent variables and the 
twelve financial variables used in the MDA were identified 
as the independent variables. The purpose of this test 
was to enable the investigator to study the linear rela­
tionship between a set of independent variables (finan­
cial variables) and a dependent variable (systematic risk). 
The basic goal of multiple regression is to produce a 
linear combination of independent variables which corre­
late as highly as possible with the dependent variable.
Spearman Rank Correlation
The Spearman Rank Correlation test was also con­
ducted to find the relationship between beta and each of 
the twelve financial variables. Detailed discussion of
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the Sprearman Rank Correlation test can be found on page 
52. The results are presented in Chapter 4.
STATISTICAL TESTS COMPARING THE HIGH QUALITY 
DISCLOSURE GROUP, THE LOW QUALITY 
DISCLOSURE GROUP, AND THE CONTROL GROUP
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Two-sample Test and Student's t-test 
In order to examine the difference between:
(1) the high quality disclosure group and the 
control group,
(2) the high quality disclosure group and the 
low quality disclosure group, and
(.3) the low quality disclosure group and the 
control group, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov two- 
sample test and the t-test were employed 
separately for each pair of the three cate­
gories mentioned above.
The detailed discussions on the Kolmogorov-Smirnov two- 
sample test and the student's t-test can be found on 
pages 39 and 41 respectively.
Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA) Procedure
To evaluate the observed beta differences between 
the high quality and the low quality groups in a more 
formal way, the analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) procedure 
was applied. The variables identified for this test
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were: (a) the disclosure score as a dependent variable,
(b) the beta weight (risk measure) as an independent vari­
able, and (c) quality (High and Low) as an independent 
variable. The beta weight is a continuous variable and, 
as such, it is a metric independent variable. Quality 
is a categorical (discrete) variable which is a non­
metric factor. The designs in which metric independent 
variables are used in conjunction with non-metric factors 
are referred to as analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) design.
The two independent variables were the concern of 
the analysis; however, the effect of risk measure (Market 
beta) was of primary concern. Specifically, the ANCOVA 
investigated the percentage of explained variance of 
the individual independent variables (systematic risk 
and quality of disclosure) in the dependent variable (dis­
closure scores). Moreover, the interaction effect of 
both independent variables in the dependent variable was 
also determined. Finally, an F-test was employed for 
the statistical significance of the differences.
Summary
In this chapter the research methodology has been 
presented. The next chapter presents the results and 
the analyses of the parametric and non-parametric 
tests discussed.
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CHAPTER 4
PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS
This chapter presents the results of the tests dis­
cussed in Chapter Three. The results are presented in 
the order in which the respective tests were conducted.
COMPARISON OF THE EXPERIMENTAL 
AND THE CONTROL SAMPLES
The control and the experimental samples were com­
pared for significant differences in their systematic 
risk. A non-parametric and parametric tests were 
employed (See Chapter 3),
Results of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov Two-Sample Test
A cumulative frequency distribution for the experi­
mental and the control groups, based on ranges of the 
market betas were constructed (See Table 4.1). The 
absolute difference between the cumulative frequency 
in each cell was calculated. The largest absolute dif­
ference (D) was 23/150 or 0.153.
In testing for the significant difference between 
the control and the experimental samples, a two-tail test 
at .05 was calculated. The critical value of D was
calculated as follows:
64


















Cumulative Frequency Distributions 















Group 17 30 67 18 15 3 150
Gontrol
Group 40 18 44 25 19 4 150
Experimental
Group 17/150 47/150 114/150 132/150 147/150 150/150
Control
Group 40/150 48/150 102/150 127/150 146/150 150/150
Absolute
Difference 23/150 11/150 12/150 5/150 1/150 0/150
CT\in
In order to reject the null hypothesis that the two-sample 
distributions are different, the absolute differences (d) 
must be equal or larger than the critical value of D is:
1.36 V150 + 150 = 1.36 150 x 150 V 300 = 1.3622500 y .013 =
1.36(.115) = .187
The largest absolute difference (d) from Table 4.1 is .153. 
Based on the above information, the null hypothesis cannot 
be rejected at the .05 significance level. The results 
indicated that both the experimental group and the control 
group may have the same beta distributions. The observed 
D indicated that the two samples have not been drawn from 
two populations in which one is stochastically larger than 
the other.
The Results of Student's t-test for the Experimental 
Group and the Control Group
The primary purpose of conducting Student's t-test
was to provide an additional test of the differences
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between systematic risk of the experimental and the control 
groups. The detailed discussion of the Student's test can 
be found in Chapter 3.
The results of the t-test are summarized in Table 4.2.
TABLE 4.2








Control 150 1.07 .27 -0.60 0.55
Experi­
mental 150 1.08 .20 -0.60 0.55
Based on the results tabulated above, the mean of the con-
trol group is 1.07, while the mean of the experimental 
group is 1.08. The t-value of each group is -0.60,
(P^ .55). The null hypothesis of no difference cannot be 
rejected. This result indicated that there is no differ­
ence between the control group and the experimental group. 
However, a further analysis of the t-test statistics indi­
cated that the variances of the two groups were statistic­
ally different at the 0.001 level of significance. This 
result showed that the dispersion of the systematic risk
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of the two groups were statistically different. The re­
sults suggest that segmental disclosures are significant 
to the securities market; however, due to the skewness of 
the distributions of the betas of the control group, 
this conclusion is not strongly supported.
THE RESULTS OF THE ANNUAL REPORTS EVALUATION
One hundred and fifty 1978 annual financial reports 
were evaluated using the evaluation design discussed in 
Chapter 3. The highest score obtained was 96% and the 
lowest score was 32%. Seventy-five of the one hundred 
and fifty firms received scores between 96% and 70%, 
while the remaining seventy-five received scores between 
69%, and 32%. The median score was 70%. The median was 
used as a basis of classifying the experimental sample 
into two groups. Specifically, the following results 
were obtained from the evaluation (See Table 4.3).
Based on these results, the sample was divided into 
two groups. The firms with 70% and above were classified 
as the high quality disclosure group. The firms with 69% 
and below were classified as the low quality disclosure 
group. The detailed scores received by each firm can be 
found in Appendix A of this study.
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TABLE 4.3
Distribution of disclosure scores 
for the experimental sample
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The Results of The Spearman Rank Correlation
As discussed in Chapter 3 the disclosure scores 
were compared statistically with SIC code scores based 
on four-digit, three-digit, and two-digit SIC codes. In 
conducting the Spearman Rank Correlation test, the follow­
ing variables were used:
(.1) Q1 = Four-digit code scores
(.2) Q2 = Three-digit code scores
(.3) Q3 = Two-digit code scores
(4) Q4 = Disclosure scores
(.5) Q5 = Beta weight (Market beta)
(6) Q6 = Number of segments reported in the annual
reports.
Detailed presentation of these variables can be found in 
Appendix A. The correlation between Q4 and Q1 is 45%, 
(i.e., r = .45) at the .0001 level of significance. The 
correlation between Q4 and Q2 is 39%. (i.e., r = .39) 
at the .0001 level of significance. The correlation be­
tween Q4 and Q3 is 29%, (i.e., r = .29) at the .0003
level of significance. The Spearman Rank Correlation 
results indicated that the segmental disclosure score 
has the highest correlated with four-digit code score. 
These results provide some evidence that disclosure scores 
obtained by the evaluation of the annual reports based 
on FASB Statement Number 14 can provide a measure of
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difference in quality of disclosure. The Spearman Rank 
Correlation test was also conducted to test the correla­
tion between Ql, Q2, Q3, Q4 and Q5 (Beta - the systematic 
risk). The purpose of this test was to determine which 
of the four disclosure scores had the highest correla­
tion with the market beta. The following results were 
obtained:
(.1) The correlation between Ql and Q5 is -25%,
(P >  . 001)
(2) The correlation between Q2 and Q5 is -22%,,
( P >  .001)
(.3) The correlation between Q3 and Q5 is -16%,
(PS .001)
(4) The correlation between Q4 and Q5 is -54%,,
( P >  .0001)
The segmental disclosure score has the highest correla­
tion with beta. This supports the earlier test, and 
indicates that the segmental disclosure score relates 
to the systematic risk of the diversified firms.
Based on the above results, the disclosure scores 
appear to capture differences in quality of disclosure 
and are related to the systematic risk. Therefore, the 
segmental disclosure scores were used to divide the
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sample observations into two groups. The high quality 
disclosure group and the low quality disclosure group 
represent the primary samples studied.
COMPARISON OF THE LOW QUALITY DISCLOSURE 
AND THE HIGH QUALITY DISCLOSURE GROUPS
The Results of Analysis of Variance Procedure
The Analysis of Variance test (ANOVA) was conducted 
to examine whether the disclosure score of the firms in 
either the high quality disclosure group or the low 
quality disclosure group were relatively the same. The 
results of the test of the high quality disclosure group 
are summarized in Table 4.4, The results of the low 
quality disclosure group are summarized in Table 4.5.
The results of the ANOVA test indicated that there 
is no difference within the high quality group. There­
fore, the null hypothesis of no difference was not re­
jected. This result substantially supports the assump­
tion that the high quality group is homogeneous on 
disclosure scores.
The results of the ANOVA test also indicated that 
there is no difference in disclosure scores within the 
low quality group. The null hypothesis of no difference 
was not rejected. This test also supports the assumption 
that the low quality group is relatively homogenous. The
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TABLE 4.4
Analysis of Variance for the High Quality Group 
Dependent Variable - Disclosure Group







Model 16 416 26 0.87 0.60 0.19
Error 58 1731 29
Corrected
Total 74 2147






Beta 16 416 0.87 00.60
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TABLE 4.5
Analysis of Variance for the Low Quality Group 
Dependent Variable - Disclosure Score





Model 16 1499 93 1.25 0.25 0.26
Error 58 4334 74
Corrected
Total 74 5834






Beta 16 1499 1.25 0.26
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ANOVA results indicated that the low disclosure quality 
and the high quality groups are sufficiently homogeneous 
for further testing.
RESULTS OF THE DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS TEST
The SPSS Computer Program "DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS" 
was used to evaluate the extent that extraneous factors 
may have effected the systematic risk of the sample 
firms. SPSS performs discriminant analysis either by en­
tering all discriminating variables directly into the 
analysis or through a stepwise method selecting the best 
set of discriminating variables. The criterion for con­
trolling the stepwise selection in this study is the mini­
mum "Mahalanobis" distance between groups. The "Mahalano- 
bis" method seeks to maximize the smallest F ratio between 
pairs of groups.
The MDA method indentified four variables with dis­
criminatory power: current assets/current liabilities
(LQ), Dividend yield (DY), Earnings to Net Worth (EN) , 
and Taxes to Net Profit (TX). The standardized Canonical 
Discriminant function coefficients were: LQ, 0.25738;
DY, -0.67004; EN, -0.30095; and TX, -0.71485. These 
coefficients indicated that the high quality disclosure 
group had a lower current ratio, higher dividend yield, 
higher earnings to Net Worth and higher taxes to Net 
Worth than the low quality disclosure group.
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The results of the MDA procedure are summarized in Tables 
4.6 and 4.7 below:
TABLE 4.6













1 TX 10.410 .91 .0019
2 DY 8.854 0000 .0001
3 EN 1.6844 .87 .0002
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The canonical correlation of the canonical discriminant 
function was 0.37 which indicated 37 percent degree of 
separation between the two groups. Wilks' Lambdas for 
the four variables, TX, DY, EN, LQ, were .94, .88, .87, 
and .87, respectively. The larger the Wilks' Lambda, the 
less distinct the group. The Wilks' Lambdas were sta­
tistically significant at the .0001 significance level.
2The minimum Mahaloanobis' D for the variables, TX, DY,
EN, and LQ, were .27, .52, .57, and .51, respectively.
2The D indicated the distance between the two groups on
2each variable. A Chi-square (X ) value of 21.07 at four 
degrees of freedom was statistically significant at the 
0,0001 significance level. The result of this test indi­
cated that the null hypothesis of no differences between 
groups should be rejected, The differences were measured 
by the four discriminating variables.
The overall significance of the discrimination be­
tween groups was evaluated by using an F ratio to test 
whether the group centroids were equal or unequal. The 
group centroids for the high quality group and the low 
quality group were -0.38615 and 0.39658, respectively. 
Box's M test was conducted to evaluate the critical value 
of F. The result showed a statistically significant dif­
ference in the group centroids at the .0001 significance 
level. The F ratio is 3.01, with 10/105 degrees of
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freedom. The null hypothesis of no differences was re­
jected. The classification results of the Multiple Dis­
criminant Analysis is presented in Table 4.8 below:
TABLE 4.8 
MDA CLASSIFICATION RESULTS
Actual Number of Predicted
Group Firms Group
1 2
1 (high quality) 75 50 25
(66.7%) (33.3%)
2 (low quality) 75 25 50
(33.3%) (66.7%)
The major test of a discriminant model is the ability 
to classify companies compared to an alternative classi­
fication method. If the error rates arising from the use 
of the model are low, the financial ratios in the MDA model 
may provide a basis to classify companies for research 
purposes. The error rates in the classification results 
presented in Table 4.8 were the same for both groups.
The high quality group (Group 1) had a 33.3% error rate
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as did the low quality group (Group 2). The overall per­
cent of the cases correctly classified was 66.7 percent. 
The maximum chance criterion that the discriminant func­
tion is a good classifier is 50 percent. The percent 
correctly classified in group one is 66.7 percent. The 
percent correctly classified in group two is also 66.7 
percent. The four variables that separated the two groups 
were investigated further, Taxes to Net Income variable 
which was the most powerful discriminating variable was 
examined by looking at the extent of industry diversifi­
cation between and within the two groups. The questions 
addressed were:
1. Were the high quality and the low quality groups 
well diversified?
2. Were firms from the same industry in both groups 
or did certain industries concentrate in one group?
An examination of these two questions indicated that both 
groups were well diversified and that no certain indus­
tries were concentrated in either group. Therefore, there 
were no differences between the two groups along either 
of the two possibilities mentioned above.
An analysis of the Taxes to Net Income variable 
indicated that the high quality group had a higher ratio 
of taxes to net income variable than the lower quality
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disclosure group. This result did not by itself indicate 
that taxes to net income variable is a good determinant 
of the systematic risk of the firms because one would ex­
pect high quality firms with low systematic risk to have 
low taxes to net income. Therefore, the taxes to net 
income variable did not pose any problem to the homo­
geneity of the two groups.
Statistical Analysis System (SAS) Computer Program 
"DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS" with a hold-out sample was also 
employed for this test. Out of the one hundred and fifty 
companies, one hundred companies were used (i.e., fifty 
companies from each group), to construct the MDA models. 
The remaining fifty companies (twenty-five companies in 
each group) were held out for the statistical test. The 
purpose of using a hold-out sample was to avoid the up­
ward bias problem in the model. The results of the SAS 
analysis were consistent with the SPSS results reported 
above.
The results of the MDA.analysis indicated that the 
two groups were statistically different on the four 
variables identified above. These variables would not 
allow the corect classification of the firms at a rate 
much better than chance. Therefore, for the firms 
studied, extraneous variables which have been shown to 
related to beta appeared not to be influential in this 
study.
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In order to further examine the relationship between 
the financial variables and the systematic risk, a Mul­
tiple Regression Analysis was conducted. The results 
are presented in Table 4.9.
TABLE 4.9
The Results of the Stepwise Multiple Regression Analysis




Taxes to Net Income 0.2482**
Cashflow per share 0.1988**
Liquidity 0.2093**
Size 0.1698**
*Significant at .001 
**Not Significant at .10
Note that the following variables do not meet the 0.5000 
significance level for entry into the regression model: 
Price/Earnings, Dividend payout, Earnings to Net Worth, 
Earnings to Net Capital Expenditures, and Growth in 
Earnings.
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The variables found to be significantly related to 
market risk were dividend yield and leverage. Leverage 
was not significantly different among all firms (the ex­
perimental sample). Dividend yield was a significant 
variable in the discriminant function. Therefore, the 
financial variables previously shown to be related to 
market risk have been controlled with the exception of 
dividend yield. The dividend yield by itself should not 
bias the investigation.
A non-parametric Spearman Rank correlation test was 
also conducted to determine if the financial variables 
affected the systematic risk. The results were identical 
to the multiple regression analysis discussed above. Fur­
thermore, the correlation of systematic risk with disclo­
sure quality was more significant than any of the twelve 
financial variables (See Table 4.10).
The Spearman Rank Correlation study validates the 
Multiple Regression tests reported earlier. Based on 
these results, liquidity did not have statistical signi­
ficant correlation with systematic risk of a firm. Also, 
taxes to net earnings did not have any significant sta­
tistical relationship with systematic risk. The dividend 
yield by itself should not bias the relationship between 
the systematic risk and the quality of disclosure.
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TABLE 4.10
Spearman Rank Correlation Results
Relationship Between Beta (Systematic Risk) 
Twelve Financial Variables and Disclosure Quality
Correlation Level of
Variables ' Coefficient Significance
1. Disclosure Quality 
(high cr low)
.47 0.001
2. Liquidity .06 0.43
3. Size -. 13 0.10
4. Cashflow per share -.11 0.18
5. Price Earnings 0.00 0.95
6. Dividend payout -0.33 0.0001
7. Dividend yield -0.04 0.0001
8. Earnings to Net Worth 0.12 0.16
9. Earnings to Capital 
Expenditures 0.05 0.54
10. Leverage 0.11 0.18
11. Earnings to Margin -0.06 0.45
12. Taxes to Net Income -0.09 0.27
13. Growth in Earnings 0.04 0.67
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COMPARISON OF SYSTEMATIC RISK AND QUALITY OF DISCLOSURE
The main objective of the study was to examine em­
pirically the impact of quality of segmental disclosures 
on the securities market. The main investigation was con­
cerned with the experimental group which was divided into 
two groups based on the disclosure scores discussed in 
Chapter 3. The first test in comparing the systematic risk 
of the high quality and the low quality groups was to ex­
amine whether the two-group cumulative distributions were 
drawn from the same population. The Kolmogorov-Smimov
two-sample test was employed for this test. The result of
the cumulative frequency distributions is presented in 
Table 4.11.
The largest absolute difference (D) is 35/75 or .4667 
(See Table 4.11). In testing for the significant differ­
ence in systematic risk between the high quality and low 
quality disclosure groups at the .01 significance level, 
equation (8) was used to calculate the critical value of D 
as follows:
1.63 1/75 + 75 = 1.63 1/0. 027 = 1.63 (0.163) = 0.2657
175 x 75 V
Based on the above information, the null hypothesis of no 
difference was rejected for the high quality and the low 
quality disclosure groups at the .0001 significance level.
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TABLE 4.11
Cumulative Frequency Distributions for the High ' 
















Group 15 26 27 4 2 1 75
Low Quality 
Group 2 4 40 14 13 2 75
High Quality 
Group 15/75 41/75 68/75 72/75 74/75 75/75
Low Quality 
Group 2/75 6/75 46/75 60/75 73/75 75/751
Absolute
Difference 13/75 35/75 22/75 12/75 1/75 0
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The observed D indicated that the two samples were drawn 
from two different populations in which one was stochasti­
cally larger than the other.
Thus far, the statistical tests showed the experimen­
tal and the control groups' cumulative beta distributions 
appeared not to be significantly different, but the high 
quality disclosure and the low quality disclosure groups' 
cumulative beta distributions appeared to be significantly 
different. However, the cumulative beta distributions of 
the high quality disclosure group and the low quality dis­
closure group have not been compared with the control 
group. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample test was used for 
the comparison. The cumulative frequency distribution is 
presented in Table 4.12 for the Control group and the High 
Quality group.
The largest absolute difference (D) is 34/150 or .2267. 
In testing for the significant difference between the con­
trol sample and the high quality group, equation (8) was 
used to calculate the critical value of D. The critical 
value of D was calculated as follows:
Based on the above information, the null hypothesis of no 
difference was rejected for the control group and the high 
quality disclosure group at the .05 significance level.
1.36 11150 + 75 = 1.36 
150 x 75
y 0 02 = 1.36(0.1414) = 0.1923


















Cumulative Frequency Distributions for The Control Group 














Control Group 40 18 44 25 19 4 150
High Quality 
Group 15 26 27 4 13 2 75
Control Group 40/150 58/150 102/150 127/150 146/150 150/150
High Quality 
Group 15/75 41/75 68/75 72/75 74/75 75/75
Absolute
Difference 10/150 25/150 34/150 17/150 2/150 0
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The observed E indicates that the two samples have been 
drawn from two different populations in which one is 
stochastically larger than the other.
Finally, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample test was 
conducted to find the difference in the cumulative beta 
distributions between the control group and the low quality 
disclosure group. The cumulative frequency distribution of 
the two groups is presented in Table 4.13.
The largest absolute difference (D) is 46/150 or .3067. 
Equation (8) was used to calculate the critical value of 
(P). The critical value of D was calculated as follows:
1.63 |/l50 + 75 = 1.63 (.1414) = 0.2305 
Kl50' x 75
Based on the above information, the null hypothesis of no 
difference was rejected for the control group and the low 
quality disclosure group at the .01 significance level.
The observed D indicated that the two groups have been 
drawn from two different populations in which one is 
stochastically larger than the other.
A Student's t-test was used to cross validate the 
non-parametric test results presented above. The results 
of the t-test statistics for the control group versus the 
high quality disclosure group, the control group versus 
the low quality disclosure group, the high quality disclo­
sure group verus the low quality disclosure group are sum­
marized in Tables 4.14, 4.15, and 4.16, respectively.


















Cumulative Frequency Distributions for The Control Group 















Control Group 40 18 44 25 19 4 150
Low Quality 
Group 2 4 40 14 13 2 75
Control Group 40/150 58/150 102/150 127/150 146/150 150/150
Low Quality 
Group 2/75 6/75 46/75 60/75 73/74 75/75
Absolute















Control 150 1.07 .27 2.42 0.01
Experimental 75 1.00 .17 2.09 0.03
TABLE 4.15
Control Group Versus Low Quality Disclosure Group
MEAN STD. T- PR0B
GROUP N BETA DEV. VALUE T
Control 150 1.07 .27 3.29 .0001
Low Quality 75 1.17 .19 2.98 .0001
The mean beta of the control group was 1.07, while that of 
the high quality disclosure group was 1.00. The t-value of 
2.42 indicated a significant difference in the mean betas 
of the two groups. Also, the variances of the two groups 
were different. Therefore, the null hypothesis of no 
difference was rejected indicating that the high quality
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disclosure firms have lower systematic risk than the con­
trol sample firms.
TABLE 4.16
High Quality Disclosure Group Versus 


















The next student’s t-test was conducted to compare
the mean betas of the control group with those of the low
quality group. The results of this test are summarized in 
Table 4.15.
The mean beta of the control group was 1.07, and that 
of the low quality disclosure group was 1.17. The t-value 
of 3.29 indicated a statistically significant difference in 
the mean betas of the two groups at the 0.001 significance 
level. The variances of the two groups were also statistic­
ally different at the 0.001 significance level. Therefore, 
the null hypothesis of no difference was rejected. These
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results indicated the control group has a lower systematic 
risk than the low quality disclosure group.
The final student's t-test was conducted to compare 
the high quality disclosure group with the low quality 
disclosure group. The results of this test are summarized 
in Table 4.16.
The mean beta of the high quality disclosure group was 
1.00; while the mean beta of the low quality disclosure 
group was 1.17. The t-value of 5.84 indicated statistical­
ly significant difference at the 0.001 significance level. 
Therefore, the null hypothesis of no difference was re­
jected. The results indicated generally the high quality 
group has a lower systematic risk than the low quality 
group.
RESULTS OF THE ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE - 
HIGH QUALITY DISCLOSURE GROUP VERSUS LOW 
QUALITY DISCLOSURE GROUP
The results of the ANCOVA Tests strongly suggest that 
the high quality group is significantly different from the 
low quality group at the 0.001 significance level. Speci­
fically, the quality of disclosure variable is signifi­
cantly different between the high quality disclosure 
firms and the low quality disclosure firms, at the 0.05 
significance level. The beta variable is significantly 
different at the 0.001 significance level. The. interaction
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effect of the quality and beta is not significant at the 
0.51 significance level. The test statistic for the 
ANCOVA test is presented in Table 4.17.
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
Line-of Business Reporting Firms Versus 
Non-Line-Of-Business Reporting Firms
One of the important issues this investigation has 
addressed concerned the capital market reaction to mandated 
FASB's Line of Business disclosures. Mautz and May sug­
gested that diversified firms that produce segmental dis­
closure information suffer competitive disadvantage as 
opposed to the diversified firms or single-product firms 
that are not required to provide line-of-business informa­
tion in their annual reports.^"
Thus study applied the Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample 
test and the student's t-statistics to examine whether 
there were differences in the beta distributions and the 
mean betas of the two samples. The results of the tests 
indicated the two samples are not statistically different. 
This finding suggests the line-of-business reporting firms
1
Mautz, R. K. , and May, W. G., "Financial Disclosure 
in a Competitive E c o n o m y Financial Executive Research 
Foundation, New York, 1978.


















Results of the Analysis of Covariance
LEVEL
OF





Model 3 15202 5069 97 .,50 0.0001 0.67
Error 146 7583 52








Quality 1 187 3.61 0.05
Beta 1 491 9.47 0.0001




may not be significantly different from the non-line-of-
2
business reporting firms.
A further analysis of the two samples indicated the 
variances of the two groups were statistically different 
at the 0.001 level of significance. Therefore, the 
equality of the group means did not tell the whole story 
about the samples. The difference in the variances be­
tween the two groups relates to the spread or variability 
of the data. The variance measures the extent to which 
the values of a set of observations are dispersed. Since 
the variances were different, the two groups were not 
homogeneous. There was a greater dispersion in the con­
trol sampe (non-line-of-business reporting firms). The 
smallest beta in the control sample was 0.55 and the 
largest beta was 1.80, while the mean was 1.07. In the 
experimental sample (line-of-business reporting firms), 
the smallest beta was 0.70 and the largest beta was 1.80, 
while the mean was 1.08. The line-of-business reporting 
firms demonstrated lower variance in systematic risk 
than the non-line-of-business reporting firms. The
2
Kang, J. S. , "A Study of Intersegment Allocation 
Problems in Segmental Financial Disclosure," Unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, Texas A & M University, 1977.
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results confirm the findings of Kinney , Collins and more
importantly, Simonds and Collins^.
6In the Foster study entitled "Externalities and
Financial Reporting", he quoted the Wall Street Journal,
29 December, 1978, p. 11 as follows:
"The company maintains that publishing informa­
tion required of public companies by the SEC 
would put it at a severe competitive disadvan­
tage, since the data would be available to its 
main competitor, the Dallas Times Herald, which 
is owned by Times Mirror Company, Los Angeles.
Belo maintains that because it is significantly 
smaller than Times Mirror, financial disclosures 
required by the SEC would reveal too much of its 
inner workings. Times Mirror owns several major 
papers and can group its newspaper financial 
data for reporting purposes. By contrast, the 
Dallas Morning News is the only major newspaper 
property of Belo." (p. 524).
The above quotation is contrary to the efficient 
market hypothesis^ which states that all publicly avail­
able information is impounded in the security prices.
3Kinney, oj3. cit.
4Collins, oj>. cit.
^Simonds and Collins, oj>. cit.
6Foster, George, "Externalities and Financial Re- ■ 
porting," The Journal of Finance, (May, 1980), pp. 521- 
532.
For further study on the Market Efficiency, See 
Fama, E. F., "The Behavior of Stock Market Prices," 
Journal of Business, (January, 1965) .
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The results obtained in this study also refutes the 
assumption that the line-of-business reporting firms are 
at a competitive disadvantage to their counterparts 
which are not required to disclose segmental data.
High Quality Disclosure Firms Versus Non-Line-Of-Busiriess 
Reporting Firms'
A further analysis was conducted to examine whether 
the control group (non-line-of-business reporting firm) 
had lower systematic risk than either the diversified 
firms that report high quality disclosures or the low
g
quality disclosures. These propositions were tested by 
using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample test and the 
student's t-test, respectively. The first proposition 
was that there was no difference between the high quality 
disclosure firms and the. control sample. The results 
provided a basis to reject the null hypothesis at the 
0.05 level of significance. Therefore, the two groups 
have been drawn from two different populations in which 
one is stochastically larger than the other.
A student's t-statistics was also conducted to find 
the difference between the mean betas of the two groups. 
The results showed that the mean betas of the two groups
8See Chapter 3 for further discussion on the Charac­
teristics of High Quality Disclosure Firms and Low 
Quality Disclosure Firms.
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were significantly different at the .016 level of signi­
ficance. The results indicated the high quality disclosure 
group generally has lower risk than the control group.
A further analysis on the difference in systematic 
risk between the two groups was conducted by investigat­
ing the difference in the variances of the two groups. 
Again, the null hypothesis that the variances are not 
statistically different was rejected at the 0.0001 level 
of significance. The minimum beta for the control group 
was 0.55 and the maximum was 1.80, while the minimum beta 
for the high quality disclosure group was 0.70 and the 
maximum was 1.65. The standard deviations of the betas 
for the control group and the high quality group were 
0.27 and 0.17, respectively. The results of this analysis 
indicated again the control group had a higher systematic 
risk than the high quality disclosure group. Investors 
appear to be less certain about the segmental data not 
disclosed by the non-line-of-business reporting firms.
Low Quality Disclosure Firms Versus Non-Line-Of-Business 
Reporting Firms
Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample test and the student's 
t-test were used to test the difference between the 
diversified firms that disclose poor segmental data and 
the non-line-of-business reporting firms. The results 
of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test indicated the two samples
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were statistically different. Therefore, the null hypo­
thesis of no difference was rejected at the 0.01 level 
of significance. The results also indicated the two 
groups come from two different populations.
A student's t-test was conducted to find whether 
there are differences between the two groups. Again, the 
null hypothesis of no difference was rejected at the 
0.001 level of significance. A further analysis on the 
variances between the two groups provided the following 
results. The minimum beta for the control group was 0.55 
and the maximum was 1.80. The minimum observation for 
the low quality group was 0.80, while the maximum obser­
vation was 1.80. The mean betas of the control group and 
the low quality group were 1.07 and 1.17 respectively.
The standard deviations of the control group and the low 
quality group were 0,27 and 0.09 respectively. Based on 
the above results, the null hypothesis of no difference in 
the variances was rejected at the 0.004 significance level. 
The results indicated the control group (non-line-of- 
business reporting firms) had a lower systematic risk 
than the low quality group (firms that report poor qual­
ity disclosures). The results further indicated the 
investors may be less certain about the segmental data 
reported by the low quality group. This situation may 
arise because the segmental information may not be
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detailed or explicit. Also, the investors may think that 
the low quality disclosure group may be hiding some in­
formation to be presented in the segmental data. These 
two situations are possibilities.
High Quality Disclosure Firms Versus Low Quality Disclo­
sure Firms
The major part of this investigation is to examine 
whether the investors react to the quality of segmental 
disclosures. The results of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 
indicated the beta distributions of the two groups were 
different at the 0.01 level of significance.
The student's t-test was conducted to examine dif­
ferences in systematic risk between the two groups. The 
minimum beta for the high quality group was 0.70, and the 
maximum was 1.65. The minimum beta for the low quality 
group was 0.80, and the maximum was 1.80. The means of 
the high quality and the low quality groups were 1.00 
and 1.17, respectively. The standard deviations of the 
high quality and the low quality groups were 1.97 and 
2.30, respectively. The results indicated the mean betas 
of the two groups are significantly different at the .001 
level of significance. The results also indicated the 
high quality disclosure group to have lower systematic 
risk than the low quality disclosure group.
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The above results are consistent with the findings of 
9the Kochanek study which reported that:
"Results of the Mann-Whitney U test at the 0.05 
level of significance confirmed the a priori 
expectation that "good" reporters would exhibit 
higher positive Spearman Rank Correlation Coeffi­
cients in the intermediate and the long-term 
models than "poor" reporters. The null hypothesis 
of no difference is, rs coefficients, between 
"good" and "poor" reporters was rejected at the
0.04 level of significance for the intermediate 
model, and at the 0.03 significance level for the 
long-term model. " (p. 256)
He concluded that his evidence suggests that segmental re­
porting aided investors in anticipating future earnings 
changes in the present valuation of securities.
10
The present study also confirms Singhvi and Desai 
study which concluded that:
Adequate disclosure of information minimized 
ignorance in the market and causes the market 
price to reflect the true value of the secur­
ity; consenquently, the price dispersion is 
narrowed down. The dispersion between the 
market price and the intrinsic value of a 
security in part is the result of the quality 
of information - the more superior the quality 
of information disclosed, the lower will be 
the price dispersion. (p. 136).
The authors reiterated that one of the reasons why the in­
vestors buy securities at a price which is higher than the
^Kochanke, oj>. cit.
"^Singhvi and Desai, 0£. cit.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
102
intrinsic value, or sell at the price which is lower than 
the intrinsic value is the lack of information which is 
necessary to determine the intrinsic value of the security. 
Most of these studies have implicitly assumed that "infor­
mation content" or "usefulness" can be discerned by ob­
serving reactions to specific information items.
Analysis of Covariance: High Quality Group Versus Low
Quality Group
A further examination on the differences between the 
high quality disclosure group and the low quality disclo­
sure group was conducted by using Analysis of Covariance 
(ANCOVA). The results suggested that the high quality 
group generally has a lower systematic risk than the low 
quality group. The model for this test is significant at
the 0.0001 level of significance. The F-value was 97.50,
2while the R-square (R ) was 0.67. The difference between 
the high quality and the low quality groups was signifi­
cant at the 0.05 level of significance, and the F-value 
was 3.61. The difference in the systematic risk between 
the high quality and the low quality group was significant 
at the 0.0001 level of significance and the F-value in this 
model was 9.47.
The ANCOVA analysis also provided a basis to test if 
the two independent variables, quality of disclosures (a 
hon-metric variable) and beta (a metric variable) were
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interactive. The results indicated there was no inter­
action between the two independent variables. The null 
hypothesis of no interaction was not rejected at the 0.51 
level of significance. The F-value was 0.43. These re­
sults indicated the reaction of the securities market to 
the quality of segmental disclosure may be independent 
of other variables.
The final chapter presents a summary, the conclusions, 
the implications, the limitations of the study and the 
recommendations for further research.
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CHAPTER 5
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Summary
The primary objective of the study was to investigate 
the securities market reaction to the quality of segmental 
reporting disclosures required by FASB Statement Number 14 
in assessing the systematic risk of diversified companies. 
The secondary objective was to update the previous studies 
which examined the securities market reaction to the SEC 
segmental disclosure rules.
The investigation was based on the assumption of the 
efficient market hypothesis in the semi-strong form that 
the stock prices adjust rapidly and in an unbiased manner 
to publicly available information. The efficient market 
research has also indicated that published financial 
statements provide data to the market that are recent and 
unobtainable from other sources. Based on the efficient 
market hypothesis and its related methodology, a basis 
for evaluating the market effects of segmental disclosures 
was provided.
To examine the securities market reaction to the seg­
mental disclosures, three hundred diversified firms were 
selected from the Value Line tape and the Value Line
104
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Investment Survey Records of 1978. The firms were divided 
into two groups:
(1) firms that reported segmental data as re­
quired by FASB Statement Number 14, and 
(.2) diversified firms that did not disclose 
segmental data.
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample test and the student's 
t-test were employed to determine any differences in the 
systematic risk between the two samples. The results of 
the non-parametric test showed that the beta cumulative 
distributions of the two samples were not significantly 
different. A student's t-test results indicated no 
statistically significant difference in the mean betas of 
the two samples. However, the variances between the two 
samples were significantly different at the 0.0001 level 
of signficance.
The next step presents the evaluation of the annual 
financial reports of the one hundred and fifty diversi­
fied firms (the experimental group) that reported segmen­
tal information in the annual financial reports. The pur­
pose of this evaluation was to classify the sample into 
two groups - high quality disclosure and low quality dis­
closure firms. SIC industry code scores were calculated 
for each of the one hundred and fifty firms. A disclo­
sure score was calcualted by dividing the points earned
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by an individual firm by the maximum points available from 
the evaluation design. For example, if a firm obtains a 
score of 72 out of the maximum score of 90, the firm ob­
tains an 80% (72/90) score. The maximum score a firm 
could obtain is one hundred percent. A Spearman Rank Cor­
relation test was used to validate the disclosure scores 
obtained from the evaluation design of the annual finan­
cial reports. The results indicated statistically signi­
ficant correlation between the SIC industry code scores^" 
and the disclosure scores at the 0.0001 level of signifi­
cance. The correlations also provide some evidence that 
the disclosure scores did measure differences in quality 
of disclosure of segment data.
The sample was divided into two groups based on the 
disclosure scores. Seventy percent was the median score 
for the one hundred and fifty firms. The firms that re­
ceived scores between 70% and 96% were classified as the 
high quality disclosure group. The firms that received 
scores between 69% and 32% were classified as the low 
quality disclosure group. One-way ANOVA was conducted 
to examine the differences within each group based on 
the disclosure scores. The results of the ANOVA test
Four-digit, three-digit,and two-digit SIC code 
scores were computed respectively. Each of these SIC 
digit codes was correlated with disclosure scores. Four­
digit code scores had the highest correlation (See Chapter 
4).
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indicated differences within groups were not statistically 
significant.
Multiple discriminant analysis was used to examine 
any differences between the two groups. Twelve financial 
variables were examined. They were the independent vari­
ables. The dependent variables were the two groups. The 
results of the Multiple Discriminant Analysis indicated 
the two groups were not statistically different except 
in the following variables: Current Assets/Current
Liabilities (LQ)» Dividend Yield (DY), Earnings to Net 
Worth (EN), and Taxes to Net Profit (.TX) .
To determine which financial variables were signifi­
cantly related to the beta, a stepwise Multiple Regression 
Analysis was conducted, in which beta was the dependent 
variable and the twelve financial variables were the 
independent variables. Only dividend yield was statistic­
ally significant at the 0.0001 level of signficance. A 
Spearman Rank Correlation test, was also conducted to find 
the relationship between the financial variables used in 
the Multiple Discriminant Analysis and the betas of the 
two groups. The results indicated Current Assets/Current 
Liabilities (LQ), Earnings to Net Worth (EN), and Taxes 
to Net Profit (TX) were not significantly associated with 
systematicic risk (beta); however, dividend yield was
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significantly correlated with systematic risk, but this 
variable by itself was not a strong discriminating vari­
able.
The major investigation of this study was to examine 
the differences in systematic risk between:
(1) the control group (diversified firms that 
reported consolidated annual financial reports 
only) and the experimental group (diverisified 
firms that reported segmental data) ,-
(2) the control group and the high quality disclo­
sure group,
(3) the control group and the low quality disclosure 
group, and
(.4) the high quality disclosure group and the low 
quality disclosure group.
The mean betas of the control group and the experimental 
group were not significantly different but the variances 
between the two groups were significantly different. Be­
cause of possible contaminating factors, beyond the con­
trol of the researcher, attributing this difference only 
to non-segmental disclosures is subject to question. The 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample tests and the t-tests were 
employed to find the differences between each pair of 
the groups listed above. The results of the comparison 
of the control group and the high quality disclosure
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group indicated there was a signifies difference in the 
beta cumulative distributions, and that the variances 
(dispersion) of the beta distributions were significantly 
different for these two groups.
A comparison of the systematic risk of the control 
group and the low quality disclosure group indicated that 
the mean betas of the two groups were statistically dif­
ferent, and that the two groups' variances were statistic­
ally different.
Three tests were conducted to compare the high qual­
ity disclosure group and the low quality disclosure group. 
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test results indicated that the 
beta cumulative distributions of the two groups were 
statistically different. The t-test results indicated 
that the two group means were also statistically differ­
ent. The Analysis of Covariance results indicated that 
the variances of groups were statistically different.
The high quality and low quality disclosure groups were also sta- 
tiscally different on the quality of disclosure, the test of inter­
action between systematic risk (a metric variable) and quality 
(a non-metric variable) indicated that the two variables 
were not interactive. That is, the interaction effect 
between beta and quality was not significant.
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Conclusions and Implications
This study indicates that the quality of disclosure 
may be a factor considered in assessing the systematic 
risk of diversified firms. Inadequate financial disclo­
sure in the annual financial reports is likely to widen 
fluctuations in the security prices since investors are 
likely to base their investment decisions, in the absence 
of adequate disclosure, on less objective measures. Conse­
quently, the cost of capital to firms may be higher, lead­
ing to inefficient allocation of capital resources in 
the economy.
Three conclusions are drawn from this investigation:
1. The findings with regard to the control group 
and the experimental group, indicate that these two 
samples may have the same group means, but the variances 
(dispersions) are different. As Beaver has noted, the 
results of this study indicate that investors are less 
certain about the financial information that is not dis­
closed
2. The findings with regard to the comparison of 
the high quality disclosure and the low quality disclosure 
groups indicate that the high quality disclosure firms 
generally may have lower systematic risk than the low 
quality disclosure firms. These findings support the 
assertion of the Financial Accounting Standards Board
^Beaver, 0£. cit.
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and the Securities and Exchange Commission that adequate 
and informative disclosures in the annual financial re­
ports and the 10K reports will enable investors to as­
sess the systematic risk of firms more accurately.
3. The findings with regard to the high quality 
disclosure group, the low quality disclosure group and 
the control group, demonstrate that the high quality 
disclosure group has lower systematic risk than either 
the control group or the low quality disclosure group.
The low quality disclosure group may be penalized with 
higher systematic risk for not disclosing adequate irifor- 
mation since the firms in this group are required to pro­
vide segmental data. The test results indicated that the 
control group has lower systematic risk than the low 
quality disclosure group, but higher systematic risk 
than the high quality disclosure group. The evidence 
indicates that the quality of disclosure appears to be 
a variable related to systematic risk. Nevertheless, 
where segment disclosures are required, the results 
indicate that investors prefer more information to less, 
and that such information appears to be informative.
Limitations of the Study
This study was quasi-experimental research. The 
sample used was not randomly selected. The effect ôf
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randomization is to minimize systematic error in the re­
sults of the research being investigated. The sample of 
firms may be situation-specific in the sense that the 
firms used are firms with the total assets of $500 inillion 
and above. The generalization of the results to smaller 
firms may create some problem. There may be other vari­
ables which interact with the quality of disclosures 
that the statistical methods used in this study were un­
able to detect or eliminate. No such variables are known 
as far as this research is concerned.
Recommendations for Further Research
The importance of segmental disclosures cannot be 
over-emphasized in this age of industrial diversification. 
Companies attempt to diversify risks of investing in one 
product line by investing in multi-product lines. As 
such, empirical investigations are needed on segmental 
reporting by the diversified companies. In the past, 
this aspect of reporting was not taken seriously because 
many companies were engaged in one or few product lines, 
but decentralization has created investment centers and 
business segments. A study is needed to investigate how 
communication of the results of operations of these 
segments could be improved to aid the financial state­
ment users.
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While this research has employed Multiple Discri­
minant Analysis, Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample test, 
t-test and the ANCOVA technique, future research studies 
could investigate this problem by using other statistical 
tools and other variables which may be useful in com­
municating the segmental information to the financial 
statement users. While this study used annual financial 
statement information and systematic risk, othe studies 
could use residual analysis. The effect of disclosures 
could be examined by observing the residual returns be­
fore and after the FASB's disclosure rule beaame effec­
tive. Finally, while this investigation found that 
those firms that have high quality segmental disclosures 
have lower systematic risk than either the control group 
or the low quality disclosure group, further investigation 
is warranted to validate these findings and other previ­
ous findings which reported similar results.
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APPENDIX A
DIVERSIFIED FIRMS THAT REPORT SEGMENTAL 
DISCLOSURES IN THE ANNUAL REPORTS
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Digits Ratio Digits Ratio
6 067 6 066
6 050 5 060
6 067 5 080
3 100 1 300
6 067 6 067
3 100 3 100
6 083 5 100
6 067 5 080
5 100 5 100
3 167 3 167
2 150 2 150
2 Disclosure Number of




















































Digits Ratio Digits Ratio
Aetna Life &
Cas. 5 060 5 050
Belco Petro.
Corp. 5 060 5 060
Bendix Corp. 4 075 4 075
Bethlehem
Steel 3 100 3 100
Boeing Company 3 133 2 200
Boise Cas­
cade Corp. 5 100 5 100
Burroughs
Corp. 5 060 4 075
Celanese Corp. 6 083 6 083
Champion
Intl. Corp. 5 060 5 060
Chesebrough- 
Ponds 6 067 5 080
Chessie
System Inc. 4 075 4 075
Chicago 
Bridge &
Iron 5 080 4 100
3 Disclosure Number of























































Digits Ratio Digits Ratio
Chrysler
Corp. 6 033 5 040
Chubb Corp. 5 100 5 100
Cities Service 
Co. 6 083 6 083
Continental 
Corp. 5 160 5 160
Continental 
Group Inc. 6 150 5 080
Continental Oil 6 067 6 067
Control Data 
Corp. 6 067 5 080
Crane Co. 6 100 5 120
Crown Cork &
Seal Company,
Inc. 3 067 3 067
Crum &
Forster 5 060 5 060
Deere & Co. 3 067 2 100
Delta
Airlines Inc. 1 200 1 200
2 Disclosure Number of
Digits Ratio Score Beta Segments in






















































Digits Ratio Digits Ratio
Diamond Intl.
Corp. 6 100 6 100
Diamond Sham­
rock Corp. 6 100 5 120
Digital Equip­
ment Corp. 4 075 4 075
Dow Chemical 6 050 4 075
Co.
DuPont 4 100 3 133
Eastern
Airlines Inc. 4 075 4 075
Eastman Kodak 
Co. 6 050 4 075
Eckerd (Jack)
Corp. 3 067 3 067
Ethyl Corp. 5 060 5 060
Evans Prod.
Corp. 5 080 5 080
Exxon Corp. 6 100 6 100
Firestone Tire 
& Rubber 6 100 5 120
2 Disclosure Number of
























































Digit Ratio Digit Ratio
Flintkote
Co. 6 083 2 250
Ford Motor 
Co. 5 040 4 050
Fruehauf
Corp. 5 040 3 067
GAF Corp. 6 050 6 050
Gatx Corp. 6 083 6 083
General 
Dynamics Corp. 6 067 5 080
General 
Motors Corp. 4 100 3 133
General
Telephone 3 167 3 167
General Tire 
& Rubber 6 067 6 067
Georgia- 
Pacific Corp. 3 133 3 133
Getty Oil Co. 6 100 6 100
Goodrich (B.F.) 5 060 5 060
2 Disclosure Number of










































































Intl. Harvester 5 

















2 Disclosure Number of
Digits Ratio Score Beta Segments in
_____________ Annual Reports
3 133 072 110 4
4 100 4
3 166 071 105 5
2 200 48 80 4
3 067 56 105 2
5 080 60 90 4
2 200 56 110 4
3 133 54 120 4
4 075 67 130 3
6 100 80 100 6
2 300 81 80 6
4 100 50 100 4
2 250 66 100 5


















Digits Ratio Digits Ratio
J ohns-Manvilie
Corp. 6 067 5 080
Kaiser Steel 
Corp. 6 033 6 033
Kimberly- 
Clark Corp. 5 060 4 075
Lear Siegler 
Inc. 6 083 6 083
Lilly, Eli & 
Co. 6 050 4 075
Lockheed
Corp. 6 050 4 075
Louisiana-
Pacific 6 033 5 040
Lubrizol Corp. 1 200 1 200
Lykes Corp. - - - -
Marathon Oil 
Co. 3 100 3 100
Martin Marietta 6 100 6 100
Masco Corp. 6 120 6 120
2 Disclosure Number of
Digits Ratio Scores Beta Segments in
___________________________________ Annual Report
4 100 50 110 4
4 050 62 120 2
2 150 68 110 3
4 125 68 120 5
2 150 62 100 3
2 150 54 120 3
3 067 62 145 2
1 200 80 95 2
3 100 74 85 3
5 120 78 90 6



















Digits Ratio Digits Ratio
McDonald1s Corp. 4 075 4 075
Mead Corp. 6 067 6 067
Merck & Co. 6 033 5 040
Minnesota 
Mining & Mfg. 6 067 6 067
Mobile Corp. 5 100 5 100
Monsanto Co. 6 100 5 120
Murphy Oil Corp. 4 125 4 125
NCR Corp. 4 075 3 100
National
Gypsum 5 120 5 120
Natomas Co. 6 100 6 100
Northrop Corp. 4 125 3 167
Olin Corp. 083 6 083
Owens-Corning 2 250 2 250
Owens-Illinois
Inc. 6 050 4 075
Paccar Inc. 6 050 4 075
2 Disclosure Number of
Digits Ratio Score Beta Segments in
___________________________________Annual Report
3 100 " 54 150 3
3 133 66 105 4
2 100 68 100 2
5 080 62 110 4
4 080 75 95 5
1 600 70 115 6
4 125 74 125 5
3 100 48 130 3
2 200 70 95 6
6 100 72 105 6
3 167 80 90 5
4 125 84 90 5
1 500 72 105 5
3 100 73 90 3
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Digits Ratio Digits Ratio
St. Paul Co.
Inc. 3 133 3 133
Sanders Asso. 3 067 3 067
Schering-
Plough 4 100 4 100
Seaboard 
Coast Line 6 083 6 083
Shell Oil Co. 6 100 6 100
Smith Kline 
Corp. (Keith) 3 100 3 100
Southern Rail­
way System 1 400 1 400
Sperry Rand 6 083 6 083
Squibb Corp. 5 180 4 100
Standard Oil 
(California) 6 083 6 083
Standard Oil 
(Indiana) 4 100 4 100
Standard Oil 
(Ohio) 5 100 5 100
2 Disclosure Number of
Digits Ratio Score Beta Segments in
___________________________________ Annual Report
2 200 52 110 4
2 100 48 155 2
2 200 62 110 4
6 083 52 120 5
4 150 88 95 6
3 100 3
1 400 70 90 4
3 167 72 130 5
4 100 70 115 4
5 100 72 105 5
4 100 78 90 4


















Digits Ratio Digits Ratio
Stauffer Chemical
Co. 6 050 5 060
Sun Company 4 150 4 150
Texaco, Inc. 4 125 3 167
Tiger Intl. 
Inc. 6 050 6 050
Trans World 
Airlines 3 100 3 100
UAL, Inc. 3 100 2 150
Union Camp Corp. 6 083 5 100
Uniroyal, Inc. 5 120 5 120
U.S. Fidelity 
& Guaranty 3 167 3 167
U.S. Gypsum Co. 6 083 5 100
U.S. Steel Corp. 6 100 5 120
United
Technologies 6 067 4 100
Upjohn Company 5 100 4 125
Vulcan Materials 6 067 4 100
2 Disclosure Number of





























































Digits Ratio Digits Ratio
Westvaco Corp. 6 050 5 060
Weyerhaeuser Co. 4 .125 4 125
Williamette 
Ind. 5 080 4 100
2 Disclosure Number of
Digits Ratio Score Beta Segments in
_________________________________ Annual Report
1 300 70 115 3
2 250 75 110 5
2 200 82 55 4
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APPENDIX B
THE FINANCIAL VARIABLES OF THE HIGH QUALITY 
DISCLOSURE GROUP AND THE LOW QUALITY DISCLOSURE 
GROUP USED IN THE DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS
135.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
136
•HMf*>r*»r*0t<Nr*i>oiOroi0Or'»ociV0OH9tf*O''a>c*>or»oit0f̂ NOino*' O O H O H O O H O ^ O N O n O N H O H H O O N N O M M O H H N H C r i H
•"■OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO
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oî «»(Nooo\rH»rTf(»iTrooooinr"»i'or'invoii)̂ HH3'ininioî inTTr'ir)VDOMn
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_ r-ô inrnr̂ or̂ oô ocoioooo
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DIVERSIFIED FIRMS (CONTROL GROUP) THAT DID NOT PIS







Alexander and Alexander 95
Allen Group 110
Allergan Pharm. 130




American Building Maintenance 110
American Electric 80
American Family Group 119
American Home Products 105
American Heritage Life 70
American Investment Co. 95





Archer Daniels MID. 115
Arden-Mayfair 80
Aristar, Incorporated 70
Arlen Realty & Development 115
Associated Dry Goods 100
Atlanta Gas Light Co. 75
Atlanta City Electric 80
Auto Train Corporation 100
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Beta
Auto Data Processing 155












Benguet Consol. "B" 110
Best Products 150
Block (H. & R.) 145
Blue Bell, Incorporated 125
Bond Industries 100
Boston Edison 70
Big Three Industries 105
Blair, John 100
Braun (C.F.) 135
Brooklyn Union Gas 65
Browning-Ferris Industries 130
Brush Wellman 100




Campbell Red Lake 35
Campbell Taggart 85
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Beta
Carpenter Technology 100
Carter Hawley Hale 105
Cascade Natural Gas 55
Cenco , Incorporated 100
Central & South West 105
Central Tel. & Utilities 75
Centronics Data Comp. 140
Charter N Y Corp. 75
Chase Manhattan Corp. 110
Chemical New York 85
Chicaga Pneumatic 90
Church's Pried Chicken 155




Cleveland Trust Corp. 75
Cluett, Peabody 105
Clorox Co. 125
Coldwell Banker & Co. 100
Colonial Stores 75
Columbia Gas System 80






Consolidated National Gas 70
Consolidated Oil & Gas 125
Continental Airlines 150
Continental Illinois Corp. 105
Continental Telephone Corp. 100
Conwood Corp. 135
Cooper-Jarrett, Inc. 95
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Corroon & Black 70
Cowless 100
Credit Thrift Finance, Inc. 90
Crocker National Corp. 90
Crouse-Hinds Co. 100
Cummins Engine Co. 95
Cunningham Drug Store 85
Data General Corp. 180
Dayton Hudson 100




Dick (A.B.) Company 100
Dr. Pepper Co. 150
Dorchester Gas Corp. 155
Dunkin Donuts 125
Edison Brothers Stores 80
First Charter Finan. 145
Faberge, Inc. 110
Falcon Seaboard Inc. 115




Friendly Ice Cream 120
Gateway Industries 100
Golden West Finan. 140
Gorden Jewelry 120
Government Employees Ins. 100
Gray Drug 70





Holiday Inns Inc. 160
Household Finance 125
IPCO Hospital Supply 145
King's Department Store 115
May Dept. Stores 115
Michigan Gas Utilities 70
Ohio Casualty Corp. 100
Ohio Edison 70
Pacific Lighting 60
South California Edison 80
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advanced teacher's Grade One Certificate from the Lagos 
State Ministry of Education. In September, 1973, he came 
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State University, and received the Bachelor of Science in 
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December1977, he obtained a Master of Business Administration 
Degree in Accounting and Finance at Youngstown State Univ­
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